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As Mexico celebrates the centennial of its Revolution and the bi-centen-
nial of its Independence, its chief historical objective-the distribution and
use of land for economic betterment and social justice-is assessed in this
article. Mexico offers a paradox: Almost half of its territory is held by a
communal form of agrarian organization called the ejido, and foreigners
are expressly limited in the ways they may own land. Yet, for most of the
last 100 years the country has been considered an economically attractive
and legally secure haven for private investment in real property. Further-
more, although the ejido has been a dismal failure in terms of economic
production and the betterment of its individual members, the reforms that
created it are considered by some to have been successful, and will be cause
for celebration this year. This article represents one of the few attempts to
present the last 100 years of Mexican land reform from a legal point of
view, that is, by a careful and coherent analysis of the legislation that pre-
ceded, occurred during, and was enacted after the Mexican Revolution.
The author's conclusion is that Mexican land reform can be seen as suc-
cessful only from a political point of view, in that through artful drafting
and the exercise of great political acumen, the leaders who emerged from
Mexico's Revolution were able to absorb and redirect the energies of its
more radical factions, and attain decades of political stability and relative
social harmony, albeit it at the cost of institutionalizing rural poverty.IN 2010, Mexico will celebrate the centennial of the two most signifi-
cant events in its history. Two hundred years ago,' beneath the night
skies of the central plateau, Miguel Hidalgo stepped before his parish
church and made a short but effective speech, in which he conveyed his
heartfelt sentiment that the gachupin should die along with his 300 years
*iD. Columbia Law School; Parker School of Foreign & Comparative Law; adjunct
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1. September 16, 1810, is officially celebrated as Mexico's Day of Independence.
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of colonial rule.2 One hundred years ago,3 Francisco Madero, represent-
ing his compatriots' impatience with the perennial presidential adminis-
trations of an octogenarian Porfirio Diaz,4 initiated a Revolution into
which his own presidency would quickly be swallowed.
This article assesses the motivation and legacy of the Mexican Revolu-
tion in terms of its most important issue, which was the place of land in
the everyday life of the average citizen. If results can be measured by raw
statistics, the Mexican Revolution led to a fundamental change in the na-
tion's ownership of real property, and even in the legal regime by which
property is owned and used. The Revolution ushered in a century which
finally saw ownership over half the nation's surface area held by roughly
28,000 communal ejidos (eh-HEE-dos), in whose precincts the typical at-
tributes of the free marketplace-the ability to buy, sell, lease, and mort-
gage land-were banned. Private ownership over strategic resources, like
oil and other hydrocarbons, was constitutionally prohibited. No private
person could own more land than closely prescribed limits allowed. Until
recently, corporations could own no farmland at all. No one can argue
that the Mexican Revolution was not revolutionary.
Against these results, on the other hand, can be juxtaposed a strange
and often contradictory reality. Mexican elites today seem just fine with
their homes in the cities and their hobby farms in the countryside. For
foreign real estate investors, in particular, Mexico seems to be run on the
same basis as most other capitalist countries. 5 Investors buy, sell, mort-
gage, and lease land in the free market for offices, factories, hotels, and
shopping centers with a legal security that must be satisfactory-if the
results now available are any indication. In the sixteen years in which
private investors have been able to bring claims for discriminatory or un-
fair behavior against the three signatories of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAiFTA), not a single claim against Mexico based
upon unfair deprivation of land ownership has even been arbitrated,
much less won.6 The two most important restraints on foreign ownership
2. Although ethnically Spanish himself, Hidalgo used the disrespectful reference of
gachupin to native-born Spaniards in the famous grito commemorated each year:
"My children: A new dispensation comes to us today. Will you receive
it? Will you free yourselves? Will you recover the lands stolen three
hundred years ago from your forefathers by the hated Spaniards? We
must act at once. .. .Will you not defend your religion and your rights as
true patriots? Long live our Lady of Guadalupe! Death to bad govern-
ment! Death to the gachupines. "[translation by author].
3. November 20, 1910, officially marks the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution.
4. Porfirio Diaz was elected president of Mexico from 1876 to 1880, and, beginning in
1884, was reelected in successive terms of office (the last one, 1910, is disputed)
until his abdication and exile in 1911 (see discussion infra).
5. "Mexico stands out as a paragon of political stability within contemporary Latin
America." Peter H. Smith, Mexico Since 1946: Dynamics of An Authoritarian Re-
gime, MI-XICO SINCE INDEPENDENCE- 321 (1991).
6. An authoritative compilation of claims brought against Mexico, that also contains
the text of all pleadings, is found in the website of the Mexican Secretaria de la
Economia [Secretariat of the Economy]; see Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
Secretaria de la Economia, in http://www.economia.gob.mx/swb/en/economiap.
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of real property-the requirement that the foreigner agree to the "Calvo
Clause" and the prohibition against direct ownership of land in the "Re-
stricted Zone" (see discussion below)-are largely symbolic.
Similarly, the radical changes ushered in by the Revolution have not
created a picture of prosperity in the countryside. Since 1940, a year that
can be seen as the high watermark in the development of Mexico's "so-
cial sector," agricultural production on the ejido, as a share of the nation's
total, has consistently fallen.7 From 1960 on, growth fell dangerously be-
hind that of the population.8 By 1980, the culture that had first perfected
the cultivation of corn was not producing enough corn to feed itself.9 The
ejido began to depopulate. By the end of the Twentieth Century, the
mean age of the total rural Mexican population was below the age of
twenty; the mean age of the ejido population, on the other hand, was
fifty-two.' 0
There are reasons for these discrepancies, these "disconnections," be-
tween the nominal and the real changes brought about by one hundred
years of land reform, and chief among them is that the reforms stare back
far beyond the year 1910 both in terms of inspiration and political pur-
pose. It is not just that the "land question" dominated the political his-
tory of both Mexican centuries. Land reform in the second century of
Mexico's existence was consciously perceived as a second chance to es-
tablish and implement the failed policies of the first, to "hit the reset but-
ton," so to speak, on all the pertinent legislation of the pre-Revolutionary
period. In so doing, the legislation that would shape land tenure and use
in the Twentieth Century would owe more to the quaint notions of a by-
gone era than the realities of the modern world. With all the complexities
and challenges of 20th century life-the shift of economic activity to indus-
trial and technological processes, the migration to the cities, the ascent of
the financial industry, the inter-connectedness of the world economy-
the Revolutionaries' vision of the future could still be reduced to the
phrase-to borrow from the American vernacular-"forty acres and a
mule"' -only the Mexican peon received far less than forty acres, and
was never given a mule. As a result, a policy designed to provide millions
solucion-controversias-inversionista (last visited July 14, 2010). According to the
author's analysis, only four claims have involved the ownership of real property:
Billy Joe Adams et al. (2000), Lomas de Santa Fe (2001), Calmark Commercial
Development, Inc. (2002), and Robert J. Frank (2002), none of which have pro-
ceeded to arbitration.
7. By 1960, fifty percent of agricultural farmland accounted for four percent of total
agricultural output, see Auge y Crisis Agropecuario, Secretariat of Agrarian Re-
form, http://207.249.24.51 /sraweb/conoce-la-sra/historia/auge-y-crisis-agropecuaria/
(last visited July 11, 2010).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Klaus Deininger & Fabrizio Bresciani, Mexico's Ejido Reforms: Their Impact on
The Functioning of Factor Markets and Land Access 3 (2001) available at http:I/
ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/2051 9.
11. A popular phrase originating from the temporary military orders issued by Gen-
eral William T. Sherman in which 400,000 acres of expropriated land in South Car-
olina, Georgia, and Florida would be redistributed among freed slaves.
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of Mexicans with the articles of bare subsistence did not accomplish even
that dubious end. Today, the great majority of the 28,000 ejidos that wind
across Mexico's central plateau or its empty coastlines are archipelagos of
poverty sustained by electronic remittances from men in other places.' 2
This assessment of land reform in the second century of Mexico' s exis-
tence quite properly begins in its first century.
1. 200 YEARS AGO
A. FALSE START
The first decades of Mexico's nationhood were undeniably rocky for
several reasons. Mexico's unfortunate presence in the path of its northern
neighbor's westward expansion must be considered one of them, but not
all of its initial problems can be blamed on external circumstances. Mex-
ico's difficulties resided in the very nature and meaning of its indepen-
dence, in the fact that many Mexicans who succeeded the Spaniards in
power in 1821 did not really envision a break from the cultural and eco-
nomic conditions of its colonial past. It is also possible they had no vision
at all. The picture we may have of New World sons rising against the
father country, eager to shake off the outworn strictures of an old and
discredited order, is an attractive one. In this image, the colonial rebel is
at least an unruly and assertive teenager, if not altogether considered a
patricide. America's War of Independence would fit this form. It would
be called a Revolutionary War (something other wars of independence,
including Mexico's, would never be called) precisely because of the con-
scious decision to turn from old forms of government to new.
In the Spanish colonies of the early Nineteenth Century, by contrast,
the "new"~ was not happening in Mexico City but in Madrid. It was the
old Spanish parents who were becoming peculiar and getting crazy with
the family car, threatening to make the kids not patricides but orphans. It
was not only French troops and a French (Corsican really) king that had
slipped into Madrid by 1810. Also sloshing across the Pyrenees (and per-
haps of greater concern to the flame-keepers of Spanish orthodoxy) were
the Enlightenment ideas of the previous century, most notably, a certain
willingness to question the absolute nature of monarchical authority, and
even the temporal if not spiritual authority of the Roman Catholic
Church.
In a series of political and military maneuvers beginning in 1808, Napo-
leon forced the abdication of Spain's Bourbon king, Carlos IV, and the
confinement of his heir, Ferdinand, in favor of his brother, Joseph Bona-
parte. With Napoleon's fortunes descending steadily thereafter, Ferdi-
nand's restoration (as Ferdinand VII) was universally accepted by 1813,
12. Money remitted by undocumented Mexican workers in the United States to Mexico
in 2008 was reported to have exceeded 25 billion U.S. dollars. Caen 11.88% Los
Envfos de Remesas a Mdxico, Ft. ECONOMISTA, Feb. 27, 2009, available at http://
eleconomista.com.mxlnotas-online/finanzas/2009/02/27/caen-49-envios-remesas-
mexico.
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and he ruled Spain from 1814 until his death in 1833. Nevertheless, a
certain Enlightenment seed, this one political, had taken root in Spanish
Soi1.13 The decade of the 1810's in Spain would be marked by an uneasy
relationship between Liberals espousing restraints on absolute rule, and a
monarch inclined to resist them. While, back in Mexico, the CriolloS'4
found some of the French ideas interesting, their exact political reaction
at the crucial times (at the beginning of the insurrection and the end) was
reactionary and conservative. In 1810, the year of Hidalgo's grito, the
criollos (and obviously churchmen) responded to a Bonaparte-led Spain
as a usurpation and broached the heady possibility of power descending
to the "people" (meaning them) pending the restoration of the legitimate
monarch.' 5 In 1821, the year of Agustin Iturbide's triumphal march into
the capital of a newly-independent Mexico, criollos would again rally to
the cause of the same Spanish monarch, this time in support of his resis-
tance to the reinstatement of the 1812 Constitution. 16
In terms of several misguided policies and personal demeanor, Ferdi-
nand miight have filled the role of George III of England in relation to
Mexico's independence, but with a huge exception: In the case of Mexico,
he was supported, not rejected, as the symbol of ancien regime orthodoxy,
spiritually and temporally. If legitimate monarchs were no longer wel-
come in Europe, they would be welcomed in Mexico.' 7 Upon their final
victory over Spanish troops in 1821, the criollos offered the "Empire of
Mexico" to Ferdinand VII and three others of his royal line. When they
declined, Agustin Iturbide, the criollo officer who had spent most of the
preceding decade decimating the insurrectionists, but who was now their
13. An example would be those legislators meeting in the city of Cadiz in 1812 who
would adopt a form of constitutional monarchy a la espanola; see The Political
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, Biblioteca Valenciana Digital, http://www.
cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/Sirve~bras/cl 8 12/l2 5939 64489522976624/pOOOO
O1.htm#I_2.
14. Criollo (akin to creole) as used in Mexican history refers to the Mexican-born
progeny of Spanish colonists, who maintained a relatively privileged position in
Mexican society, both economically and socially. The word peninsular refers to a
colonist born in Spain (i.e. the Iberian Peninsula).
15. MICHAEL C. M1EYER Er Al-., Tim COUR~SE OF MEXICAN HISTrORY 265 (7th ed.
1998).
16. The 1812 Liberal Constitution of Cadiz (see supra note 13) was abolished by Ferdi-
nand upon his restoration, and it was the attempt to restore it in 1820 that pro-
voked both Ferdinand and his loyal colonists. This "paradox" of Mexican
Independence is noted in ENRIQUE- KRAUZE, MEXico: BlioGRAPHIY OF POwE R, A
HISTORY OF MODERN ME-XICO, 1810-1996 121 (1997).
17. The "Treaty of Cordoba" between Agustin Iturbide, leader of the criollos, and
Juan O'Donoju, the Spanish captain -general, in August of 1821, provided for
Spain's recognition of the "Empire of Mexico" and for its imperial throne to be
offered first to four specific candidates of the Spanish royal dynasty; only in the
event of their refusal would the future emperor be selected by the Mexican con-
gress. See LESLFE BEi-1 IELI, MEXICO SINCE7 INDEENDENCE 2 (1991). The appetite
for a constitutional monarchy survived Spain's later rejection of the treaty (Spain
would not recognize Mexico's independence for fifteen more years) and Iturbide
was crowned emperor on July 21, 1822.
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leader, took the title upon himself.' 8 In its first half-century as a nation,
Mexicans would waste precious time trying to figure out who they wanted
to be. In rough terms, their choices were either to continue the Old
World model with some improvised link to the remaining Catholic dynas-
ties of Europe, from which a suitable Bourbon or Hapsburg might be-
come available, or to adopt, or better put, adapt to the New World model
of presidents, legislatures, and judiciaries, similar to the American model
whose success was beginning to attract the world's interest.
The catastrophe inflicted upon Mexico during that time was exacer-
bated by the failure to choose either. It is telling that the national chief
executives at either end of this period were not called presidents but em-
perors: Iturbide (1822-1823), and Maximilian I (1864-1867). Though the
leaders between these two imperial bookends might be called "presi-
dents," the tenuous nature of their leadership, as well as their lack of
wholeheartedness in embracing a republican form of government, is illus-
trated by their sheer number. Between 1824 and 1855, forty-seven presi-
dential administrations held office, each lasting an average of about eight
months.19 Rebellions erupted in Texas and, soon thereafter, in Yuca-
tan,20 Guadalajara, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi, Sonora, New Mexico, and
Tampico.21 It is hardly surprising that the Mexico of that day, whose ter-
ritory extended all the way to the northern border of today's State of
California, would tempt the territorial ambitions of other powers. In
1839, France invaded,22 but was unsuccessful. In 1846, the United States
invaded, more successfully. Only six Mexican states-Jalisco, Michoacan,
Guanajuato, Queretaro, San Luis, Aguascalientes-and the Federal Dis-
trict, itself, came to Mexico's defense with men and revenues. 23
18. Id. at 4-5. Hidalgo's grito in 1810 had unleashed a popular campaign of murder
and vengeance against the peninsular Spaniards then living in Mexico, sufficiently
horrifying his fellow criollos, that the initial movement was brought to a quick end.
Hidalgo was captured in Chihuahua in 1811, tried by his fellow clerics as a heretic,
and executed. The Insurrection continued sporadically for the following ten years,
led primarily by Vicente Guerrero, who was able to use the natural protection of
the southern mountains to his advantage (the same protection that would be used
by Emiliano Zapata 100 years later). Agustin Iturbide, a criollo assigned to lead
loyalist troops, had successfully repressed the insurrection (with the notable excep-
tion of Guerrero), but towards the end (1820), saw that his better opportunity lay
in forging an alliance with Guerrero and kicking the Spaniards out, based on a
program-the "Plan of lguala"--of loyalty to the Roman Catholic Church, inde-
pendence from Spain, and legal equality between peninsular Spaniards and Mexi-
cans. Upon victory, there were factions (epitomized by Masonic associations in
Mexico City) that desired a republican form of government, but they were out-
weighed by those still favoring the monarch as the head of state.
19. See MARIANO CUEVAS, HIS-1-011A D)E LA IGLL5SIA EN MEXICO 243-46 (6th ed.
1992).
20. Christon 1. Archer, Fashioning a New Nation, in OXFoRnI H-rORY OF MEXICO
333 (2000).
21. CUEVAS, supra note 19, at 246.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 248.
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B. THE ARMIES OF REFORM (1855-1867)
The catastrophe that had been inflicted upon Mexico was due in part to
the stubbornness of a political and economic establishment unwilling to
acknowledge or accept the new forces at work in the Western world. It
also smoothed the way for members of the next generation of Mexicans
to take power in the 1850s. This generation was known as the reformistas,
or Reformers. Its most honored hero, Benito Juarez, occupies a place in
the Mexican political pantheon similar to Lincoln's: Both came from
humble backgrounds and were contemporaries.
The Reformers represented the arrival in Mexico of Nineteenth Cen-
tury liberal and bourgeois economic and political ideas.24 In the political
sphere, it meant the adoption of democratic and republican systems of
government, especially as formulated in the United States. In the eco-
nomic sphere, it meant freer markets, freedom to contract, and laissez-
faire. In the social sphere, it largely meant the eradication of the privi-
leges and entrenched power and influence of the old elites, in particular,
the Roman Catholic Church.25
The Church seemed to embody everything the Reformers did not like
about the old antiquated order, and its perceived abuses constituted a
short list of what they wanted to change. First, the Reformers still identi-
fied land ownership as the main engine of economic prosperity; if the
Church was still the dominant landowner in Mexico, scrutiny of its role
and performance was unavoidable, and in this regard it came up short in
the Reformers' eyes.26 The instrument for the perpetuation of ecclesiasti-
cal landholding had been, for centuries, and in various countries, the
"4company sole," that is, the one-man corporation, a non-personal legal
entity owned by one shareholder (e.g., bishop) who held shares in a rep-
resentative capacity, thus allowing ownership to survive death. To those
who still equated agriculture with economic progress, and economic pro-
gress with individual initiative fueled by capital in search of profit,
Church ownership seemed particularly retrograde.
Since medieval times, the Church's propensity to hold land intermmna-
bly had become to be viewed as a "dead hand" holding back progress,
hence the name mortmain.27 It was this lack of mobility (what a modern
real estate broker might call lack of "turnover" or "frozen market") that
the Reformers cited as the official reason for some of their most impor-
tant legislation, discussed below.28
24. Paul Vanderwood, Betterment for Whom? The Reform Period: 1855-1875, in Ox-
FORi:) HISTORY OF ME~XICO 371 (2000).
25. Friedrich Katz, The Liberal Republic and the Porfiriato, in MEXICO SINCE- INI)F-
PI'NIENcFE 50 (1991); see also Vanderwood, supra note 24, at 371.
26. Katz, supra note 25, at 50. The Roman Church may have also been viewed unfa-
vorably by the Reformers because of its supposed friction or disfavor with the
mainly Protestant beliefs of the immigrant farmers it was trying to attract. Id.
27. "Mortmain," CATI-IoLIc ENCYCLOPEDIA (1913), available at http:llwww.
newadvent.org/cathen/10579a.htm.
28. The preamble to the "Lerdo Law" cited "the lack of movement or free circulation
of a great part of real property, the fundamental basis of public wealth," as "one of
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But it was not just for its perceived inefficiencies as an agribusiness that
the Catholic Church became the favored political target of the Enlighten-
ment Liberals in Mexico. To the Reformers, it did not seem possible to
dispose of the secular leaders of the ancien regime without also taking
aim at the organization that seemed woven into its warp and woof. Their
Jeffersonian vision, in which power and resources were distributed among
the free and industrious citizens of a striving and growing country,
seemed at odds with the reality before them in which millions of faithful
peasants kneeled in humble obeisance before the local priest. It would
not be enough to strip the Church of its lands. It would be necessary to
strip its hold upon the Mexican mind. Or so they reasoned.
In their first year in power, the Reformers attacked the Church at the
point of its greatest temporal strength, its ownership of land.29 Named
after the Reformer's first president, the "Lerdo Law," 30 as it came to be
called, required "civil" and "ecclesiastical" companies to divest all non-
essential lands immediately and without exception. The law's putative
aim was to place divested lands in the hands of their working tenants, for
a price equal to paid rents capitalized at the rate of six percent per an-
num.31 Anticipating that existing tenants, emotionally tied to the Church
or to the communal interests of their community, would not immediately
appreciate what was deemed good for them, the tenants' right of first
refusal would expire in three months, whereupon civil authorities could
intervene directly to sell the property, in the following order of prefer-
ence: to any sub-tenant, then to any whistleblower who alerted the au-
thorities to the violation, and then to the highest bidder at auction.32
Lands that had no tenants would be sold immediately to the highest bid-
der, and as in the case of rented land, if the owner dragged his feet in
selling, civil authorities would intervene to sell the land at auction, with
eight percent of the proceeds going to the whistleblower. 33 The only
properties exempt from forced sale were properties used exclusively for
spiritual or educational purposes, like churches, convents, and schools. 34
Another provision allowed purchasers of larger tracts to immediately
subdivide them into lots they could immediately resell, provided the lots
would remain encumbered by a master lien until the master note was
repaid in full. 35 This provision greatly facilitated financing by land specu-
the greatest obstacles to the prosperity and development of the Nation." [author's
translation].
29. Katz, supra note 25, at 49.
30. Decree of June 25, 1856, "On the divestment of rural and urban tracts adminis-
tered as owners by civil and ecclesiastical companies of the Republic." LEY DE
DESAMORTIZACION Dur B11FNES D)E CORPORACIONE-S CIVtIE- isY ECu SIASTICAS
[LFY LliRno], 28 de junio de 1856, available at http://www.biblioteca.tv/artman2/
publish/-l856-149/Ley-.Lerdo..Ley-.de..4esamortizaci-n-de-bienes-deIa i 247.
shtml.
31. Id. art. 1.
32. Idart. 10.
33. Id. arts. 5, 11.
34. Id. art. 8.
35. Id. art. 22.
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lators and developers. The text of the Lerdo Law targeted not just "ec-
clesiastical corporations" (corporaciones eclesiasticas) but "civil
corporations" (corporaciones civiles) as well. There was some confusion,
even at the time, as to what a civil corporation was intended to include,
but, in political terms, the phrase targeted the communal organizations in
which indigenous communities still held and farmed property, despite
three centuries of steady encroachments by the peninsulares and their
progeny.
In the early Sixteenth Century, Hernan Cortes came upon one of the
largest populations in the world,36 much of it organized around local and
familiar units sometimes called calpUliS.37 The various forms of the indig-
enous' own social and economic organization were legally recognized in
terms of a "Republic 38 of Indians" (as opposed to a "Republic of
Spaniards"). 39 To these calpuliS4 0 and "indigenous communities" the
Spaniards would add additional layers of social and economic arrange-
ments, displaying varying degrees of communal, cooperative, or corpo-
rate organization that reflected their evolving interests and needs. From
their own country they would emulate and transplant the ejido,41 a Latin-
36. Placed by some estimates as high as twenty-five million. See MICHAm- R. HAINES
& RICH-ARD, HAL L ST1ECKEL, POPULATriON His'rizy OF NoRwn- AmlRAICA 257
(1987).
37. Margarita Carbo, De la Republica de Indios a la Corporacion Civil, REVISTA
EICTRONICA 131 GL-OGRAFHA Y SCIENCIAxS SOCIAl FS, UNlVElRSIAD DL BARC-
L ONA, Vol. X, num. 218 (73), Aug. 1, 2006, available at http://www.ub.es/geocrit/sn/
sn-218-73.htm#_edn4.
38. A better translation of republica de los indios might be a "legal regime applicable
to the Indians (or indigenous peoples)."
39. The Spanish theoretical tolerance of existing social organizations was not all altru-
istic; they recognized the benefit of leaving in place a successful food-producing
community already accustomed to tribute. See Carbo, supra note 37.
40. The term is Aztec (nahuatl) and refers to the village unit within the administrative
and tributary system, which the arriving Spaniards sometimes referred to as barrio.
The landholding regime of the calpuli would be repeated in later manifestations in
that some land (calpulalli) was alloted to families but only in usufruct which could
be transferred only by inheritance, and with the condition that it be worked contin-
uously; other lands (altepetlalli) were assigned for the communal benefit and work-
ing of the community. See El Antecedente Lejano del Ejido, Secretariat of
Agrarian Reform, http://www.sra.gob.mx/sraweb/conoce-la-sra/historia/el-
antecedente-lejano-del-ejidol (last visited July 10, 2010). This division between in-
dividual parcels with limited rights, and common-area lands, would be extended
into the landholding system of the Colonial administration-the so-called Repub-
lica de los Indios-the individual usufructs taking the name of "tierras de comun
repartimiento" and the common lands taking the name proprios or fundo legal.
The numerous title documents assigned to these various categories by the Colonial
administration became the legal basis for agrarian claims in succeeding centuries.
See Creacion de las Republicas de Indios, Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, http:Il
www.sra.gob.mx/sraweb/conoce-la-sra/historia/creacion-de-Ias-repubicas-de-in-
dios/ (last visited July 10, 2010). The same basic division between parcels enjoyed
by individual members in usufruct, with limited rights of transfer, and the common
areas used to support the community, was carried through into modern ejido
legislation.
41. A word probably originating from the Latin that described the open lands for com-
mon use located just outside (hence exitum) of the towns of medieval Europe.
"Ejido" Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ejido (last visited
July 20, 2010).
2010] 489
490 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16
derived name referring to common lands normally adjunct to the city and
often used for common pasturage. Later, in the course of reorganizing
colonial administration, and assimilating indigenous society to the rest of
civil society, the indigenous communities would be rolled into the new
municipal governments, or ayuntamientos, into which the country was in-
tended to be organized .4 2
By the Reform Era, the term "civil corporation" had become a refer-
ence to these indigenous communities, but the extent was not clear .43 At
any rate, by virtue of the Lerdo Law, indigenous communal land was not
expropriated to the same degree as church land. In the first six months in
which the Lerdo Law took effect, $3 million of communal land was sold,
in comparison with $20 million of church land.44 After centuries of en-
croachment by Spanish hacienda owners, attrition caused by the
Spaniards' various manpower programs' 4 5 and disease, indigenous com-
munities were spared by their own typical remoteness, and the low eco-
nomic desirability of their holdings. Thirty years later, indigenous
communities would be severely disrupted by the land programs of the
Diaz administration, discussed below, but the legal pretext would shift
from the appropriation of lands held by "civil corporations," to the pre-
sumed privatization of lands presumably belonging to no one (terrenos
baldios) .4 6
Largely congregated in the middle sections of the country, the ejido47
represented a form of land ownership and economic organization at odds
with the new liberal economic model, a model that depended on compa-
nies, and individuals, acting in their own best interests and, therefore,
requiring sufficient personal freedom to do so. In the tens of thousands
of small communities that stretched from Zacatecas to Veracruz, the Re-
formers saw what we might today call "individual initiative" buried in an
old-world culture that the Reformers, themselves, considered worth bury-
ing.4 8 Like the neo-liberal reformers of our own age who saw privatiza-
42. Carbo, supra note 37 (referring to the Constitution of Cadiz of 1812).
43. Jennie Pernell, Popular Resistance to the Privatization of Communal Lands in 19th
Century Michoacan, Paper presented to the 19th International Congress of the
Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 28-30, 1995, availa-
ble at http:/Ianic.utexas.edu/project/lasa95/purnell.html.
44. Mi--'iA r-1 AL., supra note 15, at 360.
45. The encomienda, followed by the repartimiento, were the two best-known pro-
grams implemented primarily to provide low-cost labor to arriving colonists. See
generally MEYER ET AL., supra note 15, at 159-161.
46. Pernell, supra note 43.
47. While ejido is only one of several names given to the indigenous' social and eco-
nomic organizations during the Colonial Period, and is a Spanish word, in the re-
mainder of this article it will be used generally to refer to indigenous (and later
mestizo or mixed) local populations who farmed either communally or in family
parcels in which the family was entitled to retain and in many case inherit the
usufruct. In these communities, the concept of fee simple ownership was not fully
developed. Individual parcels remained within the community. By the 1920's, the
word ejido began to be used more specifically as a result of agrarian legislation
(see discussion infra).
48. Colonizar y Desamortizar, Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, http://www.sra.gob.mx/
sraweb/conoce-la-sralhistorialcolonizar-y-desamortizar/ (last visited July 10, 2010).
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tion of government-run companies as the key to economic betterment,
the liberal reformers of the mid-l9th century saw the breakup of ecclesi-
astical and communal land tenure as the necessary precursor of modern
Mexican society.49
Finally, to ensure that the Church and the "civil corporations" repre-
senting communal landowners did not reemerge as an economic force,
article 25 of the Lerdo Law, and article 27 of the new Mexican Constitu-
tion of 1857,'50 stripped them of even their legal capacity to own or admin-
ister real property, other than (in the case of church corporations) the
properties used directly for religious purposes. Without legal capacity,
the ejidos were greatly handicapped in their ability to seek legal redress
for alleged illegal expropriations of their property, a large impediment
that would be noted in the major legislation of the Mexican Revolution,
discussed below.
In hindsight, the Reformers' direct challenge to ecclesiastical and civil
landholding failed on several levels. First, it did not adequately provide
for the realization of its ostensible objective, which was to put land in the
hands of tenants and workers who could not afford to buy it.51 The Re-
form-era legislation did not provide impoverished land tenants or ejido
members with any means of financing. This omission stands in stark con-
trast with the ample financing that would be extended to foreign colonists
in the following century. Even when tenants were able to purchase their
lots, they were often preyed upon by alliances of local government and
large estate owners, who complicated their lives through devices like de-
nial of water rights, and extremely high tax assessments.52 Whether te-
nants existed or not, most land passed into auction where money
determined ownership. Many upper and middle class Mexicans boy-
cotted the land auctions on religious grounds. The remaining bidders,
who ultimately acquired most of the former lands of the Church and the
ejidos, were land speculators and large landholding companies, hardly an
emerging class of Jeffersonian farmers.53
The Reformers' direct assault on Church ownership of land was also a
political miscalculation of the first order. Many Mexicans viewed the leg-
islation (probably correctly) as an attack on the Church's role in Mexican
culture, not on its possible shortcomings as an efficient farming organiza-
tion. In addition, the forced divestiture of millions of hectares of real
property did not seem compatible with what liberal political beliefs or
49. Katz, supra note 25, at 50.
50. CONSTITUCION PO0l FICA DE LA REPIJBLICA MEXICANA DE 1857, 12 DE FE13RERO
uPE 1857 art. 27 (Mex.) ("No civil or ecclesiastical corporation, whatever its charac-
ter, denomination or purpose, shall have legal capacity to acquire real property in
ownership or its own administration, with the sole exception of buildings used di-
rectly and immediately in the service or for the purposes of the institution.").
51. Katz, supra note 25, at 51.
52. STEPHEFN H. HABER El'AL., TmEi POLIICS OF~ PROPEjz'[Y RIGHTrS: PO-ITriCAL IN-
STABILITY, CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS, AND ECONOMIC GROWI IN MEXICO 295-96
(2003).
53. Katz, supra note 25, at 50-51.
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laissez-faire capitalism supposedly stood for. Despite having passed a
new Constitution that textually was a model of Nineteenth Century Lib-
eralism, the Reformers, developed a reputation for being heavy-handed
in the administration of civil liberties.
Almost immediately upon the adoption of Mexico's second constitu-
tion (1857), the country plunged into new internecine strife .5 4 New life
was breathed into the hopes of Mexican conservatives still pining for the
old school monarchy. Ironically, their pleas were finally heard not by the
Spanish, but by the French, and not by a Bourbon but a Bonaparte. With
the help of French Emperor Napoleon 111, a suitable Hapsburg was lo-
cated (though one supposes that the term "royal headhunter" would not
have been used to describe the firm that found him), and "Maximilian I,"
as he was now called, was installed in Mexico City with the help of French
troops, a development that put the Reformers on the run, and plunged
the country into further years of civil war. The situation soon became
absurd. It had not dawned on the most reactionary and conservative
members of Mexican society that Europe had moved on and was no
longer living in the Eighteenth Century, and to the conservatives' grow-
ing horror, Maximilian appeared to have some rather progressive ideas of
his own.5 5 Maximilian's brief reign ended-and with it, any further Euro-
pean pretensions in Mexico- before a firing squad in 1867, bringing years
of civil conflict to an end. In those years, however, the Reformists would
age, and their political perceptions would harden even further.
Finally, the Reform Laws of the 1850's were probably wrong in their
own underlying assumptions. The Reformers were at least fifty years be-
hind the times in their understanding of the new economic forces then at
54. The conflict can be more properly divided into:
"War of the Reforms," 1857-1861: Essentially a civil war between the
Reformers and the Conservatives provoked by the former's strong anti-
clerical legislation, the liberal character of the 1857 Constitution (the sec-
ond of Mexico's three distinct constitutions), and perceptions of the
heavy-handed manner in which the Reformist government, ironically,
was suppressing civil liberties. Benito Juarez would assume the presi-
dency in 1858, and served until 1871, although his effective hold on
power was interrupted by the French intervention.
"War of the French Intervention," 1861-1867. Ostensibly, an interven-
tion by France, England, and Germany to force Juarez to retract his disa-
vowal of foreign debts. It might also be seen as a new attempt by the
defeated Conservatives to remove the Reformers, by supporting Napo-
leon Ill's appointment of Maximilian, a Habsburg, to rule Mexico. Max-
imilian's reign would be short-lived. The Conservatives' support of
Maximilian ebbed as signs of his own liberal tendencies became clear.
After the U.S. Civil War, the U.S. clearly began throwing its weight be-
hind Juarez, consistent with the Monroe Doctrine. Abandoned by the
European powers, Maximilian was captured near Queretaro and exe-
cuted on orders of Juarez, who wished to make the point that European
powers, especially the French, should stay out of Mexico. The French
would do so from that point forward. Nevertheless, the well meaning but
nalive Hapsburg, with his charming wife, Carlota, won a permanent place
in the romantic mythology of Mexico.
55. MEYER ET AL., supra note 15, at 374-377.
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work in the world. Like Jefferson, they imagined land as the fundamental
store of economic value and its cultivation as the fundamental engine of
economic growth.56 But this concept was already disintegrating even
when Jefferson was thinking about it. By the 1850's, the growing irrele-
vance of land tenure in a world being transformed by the Industrial
Revolution should have been noticed by the Reformers. Instead, by in-
vesting all their political capital in stripping ownership from the most
powerful political forces in Mexico, the Reformers may have squandered
a prime opportunity to bring Mexico into the 19th century, while preserv-
ing domestic tranquility. This observation would not be lost on Porfirio
Diaz.
C. THE "ONE INDISPENSABLE LEADER" (1876-1910)
Jose de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz was a young Reformer general whose
political ambitions were fulfilled when he became president in 1876. Re-
elected again in 1884, he occupied perennial terms of office until his abdi-
cation and exile in 1911. His era in Mexico is named "the Porfiriato." 57
To his country he provided an entree into the Industrial Revolution and
new international respect. By offering his countrymen a clear, practical
choice between the "carrot or the stick," he gave them three decades of
peace and order, and finally, through malice or benign neglect, he engi-
neered the conditions that would lead to the Revolution. Public revenues
and the national currency stabilized. It was an era for the building of rails
and telegraph, the erection of belle epoque monuments along the Pasec
de la Reforma, and the development of a nascent oil industry.58 Relations
with the Catholic Church, though not widely advertised, began to im-
prove. 59 Foreign investment was lured by generous tax exemptions and
subsidies. 60 In 1884, a radical change in the centuries-old rule allotting
sub-surface minerals to the sovereign spurred foreign investment in the
extractive industries. 61 At the outbreak of revolution in 1910, foreign in-
vestment stood at about $2 billion, half of which came from the United
States, and was concentrated in railroads, mining, and oil.62
Diaz was a man of his times; he could spin the intellectual attitudes of
Liberalism, and the social theories opportunistically appropriated from
Darwin' s recently published theories, in ways that allowed the strong to
prosper and the weak to serve. In this, he collaborated closely with a
like-minded group styling itself the cientificos, or scientists, who could be
counted upon to drape any policy, no matter how depredatory, in the
velveteen of fashionable intellectual theory. The chief luminary of the
56. Katz, supra note 25, at 49-51.
57. See generally BENJAMIN KEEN & Ki~rri-i HAYNES, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA
248-252 (2008).
58. Id. at 250.
59. Id. at 248.
60. Id. at 250.
61. Id.
62. ROB3ERT RYAL MILL ER, MExico: A HISTORY 267 (1985).
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cientificos, Jose 1. Limantour, who became Diaz' Finance Minister, per-
mitted himself to say things like "liberty constituted a privilege of the
select; the weak would have to yield to superior men."163 Diaz found it
politically possible to tell a foreign reporter that "the indigenous, who are
more than half of our population, care little for politics . .. They are
accustomed to look to those in authority for leadership instead of think-
ing for themselves."164 Such attitudes towards the weakest segments of
the population may have been shared by their counterparts in Washing-
ton, D.C., London, Paris, or Berlin. The problem with Mexican leaders
thinking this way was that the classes against whom this attitude was di-
rected constituted a majority of the populace. The attitude could not last
long in a nominal democracy, and it did not.
As stated above, with the help of the Lerdo Law, millions of hectares
of productive farmland, much of it in the more fertile southern and cen-
tral parts of the country, had fallen into the hands of speculators and
large individual and corporate landowners. 65 The porfiristas, coming a bit
later in the century, could turn their attention to privatizing the vast tracts
of lands that were still public, especially those in the large and relatively
empty states of the north, such as Sonora, Chihuahua, Tamaulipas and
Coahuila. 66 For the ostensible purpose of colonizing the frontier through
smallholding, much of it coming through immigration and colonization, a
new version of the Vacant Lands Law67 was enacted, followed by the Law
of Occupation and Disposal of Vacant Lands.68
The rather military and sinister sound of the words "occupation and
disposal" was appropriate. The less populated parts of Mexico were not,
of course, completely unpopulated; they had been occupied for centuries
by local people, or the remnants of those who had been dispersed during
the Conquest. And it was not that such occupation took place with no
legal basis whatsoever, but ownership often lacked the kind of documen-
tary support that stood out in a courtroom. While the ostensible purpose
of the laws was to privatize vacant public lands,69 the machinery devised
to implement the laws was strongly tilted in favor of resolving almost any
legal irregularity in that direction. A surveying company (often foreign-
owned) would survey a given region and determine which lands were "va-
63. Id. at 266.
64. James Creelman, President Diaz, Hero of the Americas, in T-z MEXICO READER:
His-roi~y, Cui_-ruiwu_, Poi-iurics 285, 289 (2003).
65. Marcelo Bitar, La Vida Economica en Mexico de 1824 a 1867, Escuela Nacional de
]a Economia de UNAM 149 (Mex., 1964).
66. Deslinde y Acaparamiento: El Reino de la Hacienda, SECRETAWfA DE LA
RE1ORMA AGRARIA, Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.sra.gob.mx/sraweb/conoce-la-sra/
historia/deslinde-y-acaparamiento-el-reino-de-la-hacienda-2/.
67. Ley de Terrenos Baldios [Vacant Lands Law], Diario Oficial de la Federacion
[D.O.], 22 de Julio de 1863 (Mex.).
68. Ley de Ocupacion y Enajenacion de Terrenos Baldios [Law of Occupation and
Disposal of Vacant Lands], Diario Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.] 26 de marzo de
1894 (Mex.).
69. Terrenos baldios, referring to a category of publicly-owned lands still recognized
today that have not been marked or staked.
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cant," hence federally owned.70 The surveying company would receive,
in compensation, one-third of the land thus demarcated, giving rise to a
monumental conflict of interest aggravated by the fact that few indige-
nous or small farmers could adequately prove their titles in modern legal
terms. 71 The remaining two-thirds of the surveyed lands would be sold
cheaply to wealthy and politically favored individuals and companies,
most of who continued as absentee owners .72 The former tenants would
be incorporated into the new latifundia through debt peonage, or some-
times, like Yaqui and Mayo Indians living in the northwestern state of
Sonora, they were shipped to the Yucatan peninsula and "contracted out"
as laborers on henequen plantations .73
According to the Mexican government's own statistics, between 1883
and 1910, fifty surveying companies staked out fifty-nine million hectares
of lands purportedly in the public domain (about thirty percent of the
entire national territory) .7 4 In compensation, they received twenty-one
million hectares, or about ten percent of the entire national territory.7 5
The remaining forty-two million acres (twenty percent of the national ter-
ritory) were conveyed by the nation mainly to hacendados, mining com-
panies, and rail companies. 76
The disparity in landholding among hacendados and companies, on the
one hand, and the millions of rural peones, on the other, became un-
hinged. One-fifth of one percent of the total number of private landown-
ers owned eighty-seven percent of the private land.7 7 Of the forty-two
million hectares of "vacant land" delivered to the nation through staking,
ninety percent was ceded to twelve individuals .7 8 Of a total Mexican
population of 15.3 million in 1910, 11,000 persons and fifty surveying
companies controlled fifty-four percent of the national territory. 79
70. Kj-iEN & HAYNES, supra note 57, at 249.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Miller, supra note 62, at 267.
74. Deslinde y Acaparamiento, supra note 66. The roughly 59 million hectares cited by
this governmental source resulted from the "surveying" activities conducted in the
largely unpopulated northern states and along the Pacific Coast. In addition, 13.4
million hectares were confiscated from agrarian communities predominantly in the
central part of the country as the result of private formal complaints (denuncias) in
which the agrarian communities were unable to adequately document their titles,
and their long-held lands were formally adjudicated (adjudicados) as "vacant,"
creating a groundswell of peasant anger that would erupt in the Revolution, and





79. Modesto Aguilar Alvarado, La Politica Agraria de los Gobiernos Nacionales y de
Sinaloa de 1920 a 1940, 6 CnLo 22, 61 (1998).
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11. 100 YEARS AGO
A. REVOLUTION (1910-1917)
In the aftermath of the era of reform and the Porfiriato, there would
emerge an array of political sensibilities towards the land that would
eventually ripen into the public policies of the Revolution and beyond.
By 1910, much of the populace had become alarmed if not disgusted by
the extreme concentration of landholding and the retrograde social con-
ditions it fostered. But different opinions were held as to the possible
solutions.
Those who still believed in the ability of the indigenous and mestizo
poor (most of Mexico's population) to operate within the market system
wanted to reprise the original smallholder strategy of the 1850's Reform-
ers (that is, the Jeffersonian vision in which land is widely held by individ-
ual and independent farmers in fee simple). But, to avoid the obvious
mistakes made by the Reformers, land would be given directly to poor
communities only after some preparation. It would be their land, but col-
lectively only for a suitable time period. Eventually, it would convert to
parceling and private, individual smallholding. This position made its
way into the legal texts of the Revolution, as we shall see below.
Other Mexicans considered smallholding a suitable goal only for the
more progressive elements (middle and upper classes) of Mexican society
as well as foreign colonists. In this view, the needs of the agrarian under-
class were "special," a euphemism that means insoluble, and their eco-
nomic interests should be permanently and specially protected. As we
shall also see below, this position became the de facto policy underlying
Mexican legislation for most of the 20th century, although perhaps not
consciously phrased in the same manner.
Others saw the agrarian problem as the domain of the legal system, a
matter of restoring legal ownership over properties that had been taken
wrongfully through the preceding decades. For them, the answer lay in
perfecting existing procedural processes in which individual rights could
be individually vindicated by creation of special agrarian tribunals or re-
storing to ejidos the legal capacity to sue. This program, too, found its
way into the texts of the Revolutionary era.
Still others saw the merit of simply giving subsistence land to the poor,
not based on a conventional legal pretext, but for reasons of political ex-
pediency, or a more radical agrarian ideology, or simple human
compassion.
Some of these sensibilities were commingled, probably incompatibly, in
the same person. Emiliano Zapata, for example, lobbied passionately for
the restitution of legal titles-a policy that depended on the improvement,
not abandonment, of the prevailing legal system. In many cases, he and
his followers oversaw the wholesale redistribution of land from the rich to
the poor-a result that required a discrete lack of concern for the rule of
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law. 80
In 1908, a seventy-seven year old Porfirio Diaz told a foreign journalist
that he would not run again in 1910.81 The news was digested by the local
populace, who greeted it warmly and with high expectations for political
change. But, not only did Diaz decide to stay in the race, he became
particularly heavy handed in the manner in which he suppressed the op-
position. His younger rival, Francisco Madero, was forced to spend elec-
tion-day in a San Luis Potosi jail. This time, the electorate did not accept
more business as usual from the now octogenarian leader. Diaz survived
the election but his legitimacy did not. Madero escaped to San Antonio,
Texas, where he organized an armed protest that quickly gained traction.
Within four months, Diaz and Madero negotiated the terms of transfer.
Diaz left Mexico for good, and died in Paris.
Madero, for his part, was a conciliator in an age that called for firmer
action. He allowed a Diaz ally to serve as interim president for five more
months, perhaps out of kindness, 82 and, even upon assuming the presi-
dency, he allowed most of Diaz's ministers and hand-picked members of
the legislature to remain in office. Despite Madero's vindication, Mex-
ico's democratic institutions had botched it. Unable to maintain his cred-
ibility with the more whole-hearted revolutionaries of the day83 or
control the porfirista leaders he had allowed to stay in power, Madero's
brief tenure came to an end before a firing squad arranged for him by his
trusted general, Victoriano Huerta.84
Huerta proved so odious to all remaining factions of the Revolution-
and, indeed, finally, to the administration of Woodrow Wilson8 5-that
they began to develop a framework for ending it. In the northern state of
Chihuahua, Doroteo Aranda, a quick-witted and charismatic muleteer
80. The political platform of the Zapatistas became known as the "Plan of Ayala."
81. Creelman, supra note 64, at 231, 242.
82. This leniency, in the face of apparent victory, provoked severe criticism at the
time, particularly by Venustiano Carranza, who became Madero's eventual politi-
cal heir. One indication that Madero might not have been the man to keep the
country together was the fact that, amidst the tumult of 1911, he found the time to
write and publish the Spiritualist's Manual in which he assumed the name of
Bhima, the second of the Pandava brothers in the Sanskrit epic, the Mahabharata.
KRAUZF, supra note 16, at 343. The biographical similarities between lBhima and
Madero will be instantly obvious to all readers of this article, but, just in case,
Bhima also suffered exile (Madero in San Antonio and New Orleans), but later
came back to successfully challenge and kill King Jarashanda. See id. Unfortu-
nately for Madero, other comparisons were not so apposite: While Bhima would
survive a trap laid by the treacherous Hidimba, and live to achieve great exploits,
Madero would not survive the similar treachery practiced by Victoriano Huerta.
See Creelman, supra note 64.
83. John Womack, Jr., The Mexican Revolution, in MEXICO SINCE INDEPENDENCE- 134
(1991). By November 1912, "disgusted with the government's academic attitude
towards 'the agrarian question,' the Morelos peasant chiefs under Zapata formally
denounced Madero, proclaiming in their Plan of Ayala a national campaign to
return land from haciendas to villages." Id. at 136.
84. See Creelman, supra note 64.
85. Womack, supra note 83, at 144. (Womack suggests U.S.-British rivalry as the pri-
mary cause of the rupture with Huerta).
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who adopted the name, "Pancho Villa," exploited the modern benefits of
rail transportation, U.S. arms, and German cavalry maneuvers to thrash
Huerta's forces along the central rail axis. In the south, his ally Emiliano
Zapata secured and held the mountainous terrain of the states of Morelos
and Guerrero.
But another significant faction of leadership also emerged, represented
by less interesting but more practical Venustiano Carranza who, like Ma-
dero, came from a prosperous northern family.86 Carrranza became the
"First Chief" of the loose and shifting factions who initially united against
Huerta, and who had significant success (particularly Villa) doing so. As
the end game came into view, a split emerged between the Cadres led by
Villa and Zapata, who we might call the "Conventionists" (named for
their convention in Aguascalientes in which their rival plan, and govern-
ment, was announced), and the self-described "Constitutionalists" led by
Carranza.
It is of continuing importance to us today to understand the nature of
the two sides battling for the soul of the Mexican nation in the concluding
years of the Mexican Revolution, less than 100 years ago. To a certain
degree, the Constitutionalists and Conventionists mirrored the two ap-
proaches in the larger world to the fundamental issues of labor rights and
the distribution of wealth in the first half of the 20th century. In one
corner-epitomized by the Conventionists in the person of Emiliano
Zapata-were those who no longer trusted the various models of eco-
nomic liberalism or institutions of bourgeois political democracy. 87 They
came to regard the instruments of such power, like federal apparatchiks
living in a distant capital city, or a judicial system applying Westernized
concepts of real estate law, as the protectors and perpetrators of a rigged
system that would inevitably crush them. They favored a new model that
would distribute land on broad based moral and social grounds rather
than strictly legal ones and that would see political power flowing down-
hill and away from a centralized federal government in Mexico City.88
In the other corner were the Constitutionalists, whose leaders, like
Carranza and his ally Alvaro Obregon, were drawn from the big northern
states and the bourgeoisie that had prospered in the Porfiriato. There is
no doubt that these men were repelled by the excesses of the Porfirian
86. In fact, men of almost identical backgrounds dominated the federal government in
the post-revolutionary era. They were almost all from the big northern states, and
mostly from prosperous families whose interests included extensive cattle-ranching
and farming: Francisco Madero, 1911-1913 (assassinated in office), from Coahuila;
Venustiano Carranza, 191 6-1 920 (assassinated in office), from Coahuila; Adolfo de
la Huerta, 1920 (interim president after Carranza's assassination), from Sonora;
Alvaro Obregon, 1920-1924, from Sonora; Plutarco Elias Calles, 1924-1928, from
Sonora; Emilio Portes Gil (interim president after assassination of Obregon before
taking office, and resigned from office), 1928-1 930, from Tamaulipas; Pascual Ortiz
Rubio, 1930-1932, from Michoacan; Abelardo Rodriguez, 1932-1934, from Sonora.
87. Womack, supra note 83, at 142.
88. The point should be reiterated, however, that Zapata continued to attach impor-
tance to the vindication of conventional legal rights to land.
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age, and fought for a wholesale change in the economic and social condi-
tions of the country. They did so, however, as the reformers, not destroy-
ers, of an existing political model.
Intense fighting occurred between the Conventionist and Constitution-
alist forces for the last half of 1914 and the first half of 1915.89 With the
country's raw mood and manpower favoring Zapata and Villa, the Con-
stitutionalists' eventual victory could only have been gained by drawing
upon another resource, one that was not necessarily present in other
countries of that era that were undergoing the same political distortions
and one that still characterizes the rather unique politics of the country to
this day. That resource was the superb political acumen of its leadership
class. To provide only one of several examples, Villa and Zapata repre-
sented what might be called the Agrarian Revolutionaries, but there was
still a vital revolutionary component of unionized and highly radicalized
workers in Mexico City and in some of the industrial areas lying to its
east that had never joined the Villistas and Zapatistas' military or culture.
The Casa del Obrero Mundial (World Worker's House), one of the most
radical of the unions, claimed 100,000 members.90 They were far more
citified than their agrarian comrades, their leaders faced eastward, to-
wards Europe, for political inspiration, and, as a result, they labeled
themselves "anarchists" and decked their meeting halls with the red and
black of that international movement.9' Nevertheless, it was the Consti-
tutionalists, whom the trade unionists could easily have mocked as hide-
ously bourgeois, not Zapata or Villa, that enlisted their active support. In
a display of ideological suppleness that has marked Mexico's ruling class
ever since, Obregon not only talked the anarchists into his own camp, he
inspired them to fight Villa under the direction of his own officers.92 The
so-called "Red Battalions" moved into the broad central plateau of the
Bajio, and, with the help of American machine guns and German military
advisors, turned back Villa's far more experienced troops at Celaya,
Leon, and Aguascalientes. While Villa's and Zapata's influence was
never erased-they would retain their political and symbolic influence in
the revolutionary movement for years to come-it was the Constitution-
alists who ran the machinery of government from that point forward.
The same political calculus that allowed the Constitutionalists to make
strange bedfellows of the anarchical trade unionists, now compelled Car-
ranza to adopt the radical agrarian planks of the Zapatistas' agrarian plat-
form-at least temporarily, and to the extent his own instincts would allow
him to do So. 93 Carranza was a practical man from the northern state of
89. CIIARLES CURTIS CUMBERLAND, ME'XICAN REVOL UTION: Tin7E CoNs-rrurioNA,.-
IST YEARS 186-87 (1972).
90. Womack, supra note 83, at 156.
91. Id. (One of which was the House of Blue Tiles (now Sanborn's Restaurant), occu-
pying the corner next to the Fine Arts Palace in Mexico City).
92. Id. at 161.
93. Carranza's lack of natural sympathies for the more radical agrarians are shown in
the words of one of his most significant speeches: "Once the armed struggle ... is
completed, Mexico will have to embark upon the formidable and majestic task of
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Coahuila, himself a substantial landowner. His natural sympathies in-
clined him more towards the Reformers of the 1850's and their liberal
Constitution of 1857 (still operative until 1917) .9 In his view, the Re-
formers were not wrong to have broken up the civil corporations by
which ejidal farming was carried out in communal fashion or to facilitate
the colonization and private ownership of public lands. Their error, ac-
cording to Carranza, was in their implementation, specifically the manner
in which the divested land had bypassed the poor communities involved,
and had gone directly to speculators, the wealthy, and foreigners. The
Carranzista policy taking shape by the year 1915 would hold that the
wrongs perpetrated in the name of economic and political liberalism in
the preceding sixty years should be undone, and the dials reset to the year
1857. This time, however, the land would be directly placed into the
hands of the intended beneficiaries, who happened to include many
Zapatistas.
B. LAW OF JANUARY 6, 1915
Carranza's political turn to the Zapatistas was embodied in his Law of
January 6, 1915.95 The law was officially incorporated by name into the
most important land articles of the 1917 Constitution. It is the quintes-
sential piece of Carranza legislation as much for its political artfulness as
for its artifice. It facilitated the Constitutionalists' survival and eventual
triumph. In so doing, it established the pattern and technique of political
governance during the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods.
Its preamble began with a mea culpa for the misdirected legislation of
the Reformistas: "[U]nder the pretext of complying with the [Lerdo Law],
and other regulations ordering the division and conversion to private
property," it began, "communal lands that were granted to the Agrarian
population by the colonial government were seized," and, instead of such
lands being sold to "the neighbors of the villages to which they be-
longed," they "came into the hands of so many speculators."19 6 Lamented
as well was the seizure of other lands that had, perhaps, never been le-
gally owned by their inhabitants in the strictest sense, but that had
"originated with a family or families in common possession of tracts..
that continued undivided for generations."19 7 Both types of seizures, it
was claimed, had been made under the pretext of the "laws [of the Re-
the social struggle-the class struggle, whether we ourselves like it or not ...
Speech by Venustiano Carranza, quoted in KRAUZE, supra note 16, at 343 (empha-
sis added).
94. Carranza's father had loaned money to Juarez during some of the latter's darker
hours, and Juarez occupied a place at the apex of the Carranza family political
pantheon. See id. at 335.
95. Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de 6 de enero de 1915 [Law of Endowment and
Restitution of Lands and Waters], reproduced in Jui-io CUADROS CALDAS, CA-
cismo AC;RARio 7 (1999).
96. Law of Endowment and Restitution of Lands and Waters in CALDAS, supra note
95, at 7-9.
97. Id.
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form], . . .or by sales carried out by [the tax authorities], or under the
pretext of boundary proceedings, to benefit those who reported excessive
holdings, and the so-called surveying companies."198 The laws under the
prevailing system had "made a mockery" of the ability of aggrieved par-
ties to seek redress. In the case of disenfranchised civil companies, it was
because the 1857 Constitution had officially outlawed their legal exis-
tence. In the case of the indigenous communities evicted in the wake of
the surveying of public lands in the latter part of the 19th century, it was
because the legal standing for protecting such communities was cynically
entrusted to the very local authorities who were among the primary bene-
ficiaries of the public land grab.
Those who had profited from these injustices had no grounds for pro-
test, the preamble continued: Their initial acquisitions had been "in ex-
press violation of such laws, that had only ordered the distribution of
communal assets to neighboring peoples, not strangers." The current
owners had no grounds for claiming ownership through adverse posses-
sion, because the laws under which they had acquired their properties did
not "establish the prescriptive rights with respect to such properties."
To remedy this situation, restitution through legal proceedings would
not be enough because "sales . .. had been made in accordance with the
law, or because titles had been lost, or were deficient, or because it was
impossible to identify the parcels or fix their boundaries." 99 In such
cases, there would be no other solutions than for the "higher military
authorities in each place, after carrying out the necessary expropriations,
to give lands to those who needed them . . . "0
The final paragraph of the preamble is interesting, and not often
remembered: The legislation never intended the ejido communal form of
land ownership to again become a permanent fixture in the Mexican real
estate system, but rather a provisional station on the way to direct fee
ownership by members of the indigenous communities. The principle of
small land ownership was very much on Carranza's mind. In carrying out
the expropriations and distributions, the Preamble stated, "it was not a
matter of bringing back the old communities, nor of creating new, similar
ones, but simply of giving such lands to the miserable rural populations
who lack them today . . . [O]wnership of such lands shall not belong to
the people in common (a comun), but rather. .. .they shall be partitioned
off in full ownership, although with the restrictions necessary to prevent
greedy speculators, foreigners in particular, from taking over their owner-
ship, as invariably happened upon the legal distribution of ejidos. .. .in the




101. It appears that Carranza could not bring himself to convey full ownership to the
rural poor immediately because he, too, shared the common view of his time that
the poor were not prepared for such responsibility: "[AJIl we need to do is to
enlighten the people, to teach them-with dedication, with concern and with
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Thus, the revolutionary land policy would be based both on restitution
(restitucion)-a classical legal remedy for the recovery and vindication of
legal rights, on a case-by-case basis-and endowment (dotacion)-the sim-
ple distribution of land to a group of people who may not have the com-
plete means of proving their claims in court but who have nevertheless
been injured by past social wrongs, or are simply living in an injured con-
dition. Endowment was intended to be summary, collective, and direct,
however, once lands were received by the community in question, future
legislation would direct the manner in which they were to be partitioned
and conveyed to members of the community in fee simple.
After so sweeping a preamble, one might have expected the Mexican
sun to have risen over a new bolshevik heaven of mass expropriations
(and that was, in fact, it's hoped-for impression on many of the Zapatis-
tas), but such was not the case. The operative provisions of the law may
be summarized as follows: 10 2
The genius of the legislation lay in certain wording that could have
given the impression-to those who wanted to hear it this way-that
all transfers of property made under the laws of the Reform era were
automatically invalidated. A closer reading, however, would estab-
lish that the only transactions that might be invalidated were those
that could be proven to have taken place "illegally"-and such ille-
gality had to be established on a case-by-case basis within the frame-
work of conventional restitution (reivindicacion) proceedings, with
the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of the disenfranchised
communities. The new legislation did not establish any new ele-
ments on which "illegality" might be based; thus, aside from restor-
ing the communities' legal standing to bring such actions, the new
love-how to make sensible legal use of their freedoms, and to guide them until
they understand public problems." See William H. Beezley, Governor Carranza
and the Revolution in Coahuila, 33 Ti-n Ami-AZICAS 1 (1976). The similarity of this
language to that of Porfirio Diaz quoted above, and the fact that both were re-
ported in U.S. publications (in other words, where foreigners were the intended
audience) is striking.
102. "Article 1. The following are declared null:
1. "All alienations of lands, waters and mountains belonging to the vil-
lages, ranches, congregations or communities, made by the political exec-
utives, state governors, or any other local authority, in violation of the
provisions of the Law of June 25, 1856 and related rules;
11. "All concessions, compositions or sales of lands, waters or mountains
made by. .. .any. .. .federal authority from the first day of December of
1876 until the present, pursuant to which ejidos, distributed lands or any
other kind of land belonging to villages, ranches, congregations or com-
munities were illegally invaded or occupied;
1ll. "All judicial boundary determinations [diligencias de apeo y
deslinde] made during the period of time referenced in the preceding
section, pursuant to which ejidos, distributed lands or any other kind of
land belonging to villages, ranches, congregations or communities were
illegally invaded or occupied." Constitucion Politica de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, Diaro Oficial de la Federacion
[D.O.I, 5 dle Febrero de 1917, art. I (Mex.).
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legislation did not provide them with any particular remedies they
did not have before. In essence, it is not exactly revolutionary to tell
someone that, if he or she can establish the illegality of a certain
transaction under existing law, then that transaction will be
invalidated.
" The other category of disenfranchised communities described in the
preamble-those who had long occupied their lands but whose legal
titles may not have been good enough to vindicate in court- *could
petition for outright endowment (dotacion) of lands necessary for
their maintenance. Neither the communities nor the lands are iden-
tified.103 Importantly, the text does not literally require that the
lands to be used for endowment be the same lands on which the
communities had lived. As the discussion below attempts to explain,
this was a significant detail that allowed the large estates to survive
almost intact during the following two decades, while communities
were endowed with generally inferior public lands.
" Cases for restitution and endowment would be submitted to local
governors, with the help of local agrarian boards; the provisional
awards made by governors would then be vetted by a new federal
agrarian commission.
" On the other hand, private landholders who considered themselves
aggrieved by any land decision had the right to bring an action
before federal tribunals,' 04 whether through ordinary civil proceed-
ings, or by a convoluted federal procedure called amparo (see
below).
" Future regulations would define the manner in which the new lands
would be subdivided and transferred in individual ownership.' 05
By failing to provide any criteria by which illegality might be proved, in
the case of restitution proceedings by which a particular community enti-
tled to endowment might be identified, or even by which its entitlement
might arise in the first place, and, above all, by placing the entire imple-
mentation of the program within the personal discretion of local Agrarian
103. KRAUZE, supra note 16, at 352: "The beneficiaries of the new law were to be the
'pueblos,' but the law did not precisely define them. The social fabric of the Mexi-
can countryside included figures that the law ignored: partners owning small
ranches, tenant farmers, agricultural peons, laborers living in shanties on the haci-
endas. Carranza had hoped for the peaceful submission of reality to the law, but
violent reality, in many areas, went beyond the law." See also RAYMONiD B.
CRAIB3, CARTOGRAPHIC Mixico: A HISTORY OF STATEF FIXATIONS AM) FUGITIVE
LANDSCAPES 223 (2004): "Underneath the progressive patina, Carranza's procla-
mation elided practical issues of implementation to the degree that one CNA [Na-
tional Agrarian Commission, part of a new bureaucracy established to hear claims]
official recalled that he and his colleagues operated 'blind.' Lengthy delays and
Byzantine discussions over questions of jurisdiction, the relationship between
grants and restitutions, and even the definition of the word 'ejido' ensued, leaving
CLA [Local Agrarian Commissions] and CNA staff with little to show after a
year's work.
104. Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones, art. 10.
105. Id. art. 11.
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commissions and governors, implementation could not have been made
more political and discretionary.' 0 6 Additionally, the legislation was una-
ble to accomplish its announced goals on any wide scale, except in those
states already under the control of the agrarian radicals where most lands
had already been distributed to the peasantry. 107 In the two years be-
tween the Law of January 6, 1915, and the enactment of the new Consti-
tution of February 5, 1917, a "total of nine villages in the entire country
were established through the reform."'108 A report later written by the
manager of a British-owned oil company would observe of Carranza: "A
tendency to conservatism is observable now that the government is..
not so dependent on the radical military element. Undoubtedly Carranza
is doing his utmost to free himself from the extremists . .. You probably
know that they returned Don Jose Limantour's properties."10 9
C. CONSTITUTION OF 1917
By 1917, the Constitutionalists had consolidated power sufficiently to
institutionalize their platform in a new constitution, Mexico's third and
current one. The essential provisions of land reform were contained in
Article 27110:
Sub-surface minerals. The first plank of the new land program was to
return subsurface minerals, as well as other national resources, to the
sovereign (in this case the Nation), a rule that had been in place
since the country was owned by the King of Spain, and whose appli-
cation had only been suspended in 1884111 to encourage investment
by private oil companies. In 1917, the removal of hydrocarbons from
the private sector became one of the most successful symbols of na-
tional sovereignty and of independence in Mexican politics, then,
and since. Nevertheless, little would happen during or in the imme-
diate aftermath of the Revolution to disturb private ownership rights
in subsurface minerals and oil deposits. Throughout the 1920s, the
United States would successfully lobby the Mexican government to
exempt American real estate interests (including below-ground real
106. CRAIB, supra note 103, at 224.
107. According to one source, Zapata's acquiescence in a Carranza-led government was
secured by promises that his forces could retain the lands previously seized in the
"Zapatista Zone" (states of Morelos and Guerrero). See Jean Meyer, Revolution
and Reconstruction in the 1920s, inl MEXICO SINCE INI)EI'ENDENCE 233 (1991).
And, of course, Zapata's acquiescence was further secured by his assassination in
1919 carefully arranged by Carranza supporters. Womack, supra note 83, at 188.
108. Womack, supra note 83, at 125, 169.
109. Id. at 179.
110. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27.
111. A Mining Code (Codigo de Mineria) promulgated on November 22, 1884, imple-
menting authorizing legislation granted in the previous year, gave ownership over
minerals in the earth to those who discovered and filed claims upon them (article
3), for an unlimited time as long as the exploitation was continuous (article 4).
Private owners could include foreigners (article 6), and private rights were freely
transferable (article 7).
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estate interests) from the provisions of the 1917 Constitution.' 12 In
the last years of the Obregon administration (1920-1924), and early
years of Calles' (1924-1928), these efforts resulted in "understand-
ings" named after the street in Mexico City where many of the talks
were held (Bucareli)."13 Sub-surface mineral ownership would be
"grandfathered," that is, rights in place at the time of the Revolution
would be respected. Additionally, in 1925, Mexico enacted a Ley del
Petroleo (Petroleum Law) that expressly permitted the granting of
oil concessions to private companies, even those foreign-owned. 114
Foreign investment in real estate. Despite all the anti-foreign rhetoric
that one may have heard during and after the Revolution, the actual
legislation produced in the course of the 20th century that was de-
signed to prohibit, restrict, or limit foreign investment in Mexican
real property, per se, was almost non-existent, and largely symbolic.
It would be almost entirely contained within the provisions of Article
27 of the 1917 Constitution, and those provisions remain mostly un-
altered to the present day.' 15 The foreign owner must accept the so-
called Calvo Clause under which it agrees to be treated as a Mexican
in terms of its investment, and not invoke the protection of his or her
home government in the event of a dispute.116 In practical terms,
acceptance of the Calvo Clause has been considered meaningless.
The only other restriction on foreign ownership of real estate con-
cerned purchases made in the so-called Restricted Zone, defined as a
strip of land 50 kilometers in width along the coastlines, and 100 kilo-
meters in width along Mexico's boundaries with the United States,
Guatemala, and Belize. 117 Unlike land in other parts of Mexico
where the foreigner's name may appear in the property's title, for-
eigners' interests in Restricted Zone property used for residential
purposes could only take the form of beneficial interests in Mexican
trusts in which Mexican financial institutions acted as trustees. Since
1917, the Mexican government has been considered scrupulous in re-
specting the beneficial rights of foreigners in trusts established to
hold residential property in the Restricted Zone, as the survey of
NAFTFA claims brought against Mexico, referred to earlier in this
112. On these efforts, see generally Meyer, supra note 107.
113. Id. at 206.
114. Ley reglamentaria del articulo 27 constitucional en el ramo del petroleo [Petro-
leum Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.] arts. 4 & 5, 26 de
Diciembre de 1925 (Mex.). The only condition imposed on foreigners was their
consent to the Calvo Clause, and the prohibition of outright ownership of re-
sources by a foreign government.
115. Implemented in the Ley de Inversion Extranjera (Law of Foreign Investment), and
refined further by Mexico's undertakings under international treaties and agree-
ments, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement. See Ley de Inversion
Extranjera [Law of Foreign Investment], as amended, Diario Official de la Federa-
cion [D.O.1, 27 de Diciembre de 1993 (Mex.); North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 1. L.M. 289 (1993).
116. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. 1.
117. Id.
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article, evidences.118 Additionally, the impact of this restriction has
been softened considerably, first by permitting foreigners who wish
to invest in the Restricted Zone for commercial purposes to do so as
sole shareholders of Mexican corporations taking direct title.' 19 Sec-
ond, in the years immediately following the Revolution, the Ameri-
can government successfully lobbied its Mexican counterpart to pass
a new Foreigner Law (Ley de Extranjeria)120 to grandfather the in-
terests of Americans who owned land in the Restricted Zone. Their
direct ownership would be respected during their natural lives.
*Catholic Church. It seems that the divestiture of Church property in
the 19th century did not fully sate the appetite of certain segments of
the Mexican population who wanted more. It will be remembered
that the 1856 Lerdo Law stripped the Church of lands not deemed
essential to its ecclesiastical function. That measure had contributed
in large part to ten years of civil war. Arguably, the measure was too
radical or could have been implemented more diplomatically, but at
least it represented a semi-rational policy at the time. In 1917, by
contrast, the goal was to strip the Church even of its churches, nun-
neries, and schools. 121 Other provisions of the new constitution se-
verely curtailed the political activities of the clergy. 12 2 All property
used for ecclesiastical purposes, including the homes of priests, bish-
ops, nunneries, seminaries, were declared state property, to be used
118. The author is not aware of a single instance in which beneficial rights in a Mexican
trust holding land in the Restricted Zone have been expropriated or threatened
based on the holder's nationality.
119. Subject to minimum shareholder requirements imposed on all Mexican corpora-
tions; the minimum number of shareholders of a Mexican business corporation
(sociedad anonima) is two.
120. Ley de Extranjeria, Fraccion I del articulo 27 constitucional [Organic Law Article
27 Section 11, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 31 de Diciembre
de 1925 (Mex.), in CAILoAS, supra note 95, at 52.
121. Constitucion Politica. de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. 11 (original
text, author's translation): "Religious associations called churches [iglesias],
whatever be their creed, shall in no case have capacity to acquire, possess, or ad-
minister real property. .. .that which they may have now, directly or through an
intermediary, shall become the property of the Nation. . .The bishops' residences,
rectories, seminaries, retreats or colleges of religious associations, convents, or any
other edifice that may have been built for or for the use of the administration,
dissemination of information, or teaching of a religious sect, shall pass henceforth,
and in full ownership. To the direct dominion of Nation to be used in public ser-
vice by the Federation or its respective States."
122. The original article 130 begins with the statement that "the historical principle of
the separation of the State and the churches is the basis for the rules set forth in
this provision"-a statement curious because the principle had never been particu-
larly well recognized in Mexico. The article really deals with another historical
principle, that of free speech and association, or the suppression thereof. The
clergy was prohibited from: holding public office; supporting or opposing a politi-
cal candidate or party; or "opposing the laws of the country." No political associa-
tion could use a word in its name referring to a religious association (perhaps
accounting for why the party currently holding the presidency of Mexico is not
called the "Christian Democrats"); and no meeting held for a political purpose
could take place in a church.
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as governmental offices.' 23 This time, the policy served no real social
purpose, except, perhaps, the ventilation of personal or political
anim us.
It would take Mexican legislators almost ten years to implement the
anti-clerical provisions of Article 27, and the predictable result would be
renewed civil conflict. The Cristero Wars of the 1920s would take tens of
thousands of lives, and destroy or dislocate hundreds of thousands more.
The Roman Catholic Church would temporarily leave Mexico officially,
and deny sacraments. Eventually, the Church would come back. Eventu-
ally, Mexican political leaders would once again proclaim their Christian-
ity and belief in God, and the state and Church would achieve a type of
co-existence which endures to this day. But political observers would still
be left wondering exactly what benefits this innately Catholic nation
would derive from the conflict.
*Ejido creation. The fourth major thrust of Article 27 was to address
the primary issues of agrarian landholding that were part of the ma-
jor political objectives of the Revolution, discussed above: (i) the
need to restore lost lands to the ejidos, or to provide them with new
ones, and (ii) the breakup of the latifundia.
Several paragraphs of the original Article 27124 appeared to go even
further than the Law of January 6, 1915, in making broad, bold proposals
for restitution. All transfers of land made pursuant to Reform legislation
(specifically, the Lerdo Law) that had deprived communities of their
lands, woods, and waters were nullified. But, on closer inspection, the
change was not so radical. Lands would be restored "pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Law of January 6, 1915, which will remain in effect as a
123. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. 11.
124. The original text of Article 27, subsection V11, paragraph 3, of the 1917 Constitu-
tion, reads:
"All proceedings, rulings, resolutions and transactions relative to
surveys, concessions, compositions, judgments, transactions, sales or auc-
tions that have deprived, totally or partially, commonly-held lands, ham-
lets, villages, congregations, tribes, or other bodies of population, that
may still exist, from the Law of June 25, 1856, are declared
null... Accordingly, all the lands, woods and waters from which the fore-
going ... were deprived, shall be restored to them in accordance with the
Decree of January 6, 1915, which shall continue in effect as a constitu-
tional law. In the event that, in accordance with such Decree, the award
of the lands requested by any of the foregoing bodies is not appropriate,
by way of restitution, they shall be given in endowment . .. There shall
be as an exception to the aforementioned nullification only those lands
titled as the result of distributions made pursuant to the cited Decree of
January 6, 1915, or those held in possession in their own name as owner
for more than ten years, when the surface area does not exceed 50 hect-
ares. The excess of such surface area shall be returned to the commu-
nity, indemnifying the owner for its value .. . Only members of the
community shall have the right to the distributed lands and the rights to
such lands shall be inalienable as long as they remain undivided, as well
as rights of ownership, after they have been divided." See Constitucion
Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27.
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constitutional law."'125 The invalidation would not be self-effectuating. It
would require that further proceedings be brought successfully by the af-
fected entities.
Other provisions were similarly intended to soften the blow of Revolu-
tion upon the thousands of persons who had purchased land-presuma-
bly in good faith-under the Reform-era laws.126 To do this, the
Revolutionists blended two policies: (i) the doctrine of adverse posses-
sion, to which Mexico had long adhered as a part of the Civil Law tradi-
tion, and which could therefore be employed without straining traditional
notions of Western justice, and (ii) the still politically viable concept of
the smallholder. Those Reform-era landowners who had occupied their
lands for more than ten years would be entitled to keep them, but only to
the extent of fifty hectares.127 This part of Article 27 is particularly inter-
esting because it provides the best example of what the Revolutionists (at
least the faction that prevailed) really wanted, which was to perfect, not
abolish, the laws of the Reform era. Retroactively, through constitutional
mandate, lands divested by the Reform-era laws-even if done so ille-
gally-would remain in the hands of the "small farmers" who had pre-
sumably worked them. Absentee latifundists would be excluded.
Article 27 also carried forward the program, first laid out in the Law of
January 6, 1915, of endowing (through dotacion) communities which
might not be able to prove restitution in the strictest legal sense, "in the
event that, pursuant to such Decree [of January 6, 1915], lands [were] not
adjudicated as a result of restitution proceedings, they might be given" to
the plaintiffs by way of endowment. 128 This language did not address the
issues of where the land would come from, or how exactly such endow-
ment would come about, or who would make such decision. Clues must
be gleaned from other portions of Article 27, such as the stand-alone par-
agraph that refers to the land coming from "immediately proximate
properties," always respecting, however, the "rights of small
landholding:"
The villages and communities that lack land and water, or who do
not have them in quantities sufficient for their needs, shall have the
right to be endowed with them, taking them from immediately proxi-
mate properties, always respecting the rights of the small
land owner.'129
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the key idea present in the Decree
of January 6, 1915, that the communal form of land ownership was only a
temporary station on the way to full fee ownership of individual parcels,





129. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. I (original
text, author's translation).
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the right to the distributed lands, and the rights to such lands shall be
inalienable as long as they remain undivided, as well as rights of owner-
ship, after they have been divided."1130 The Carranzista formula was pre-
served: The communal form of ownership would eventually give way to
partition, and subsequent distribution, of parcels to the individual mem-
bers of the community.
" Breakup of latifundia. Article 27 further directed federal and state
congresses to enact the legislation by which the "subdivision of large
properties would be carried out," in accordance with the following:
0 Each state jurisdiction would fix the maximum amount of land that
one person or legally created company could own within its respec-
tive jurisdiction. 13 1
o Most importantly, it would also be the local law that would deter-
mine the time period in which over-sized properties must be parti-
tioned, as well as the terms and manner of sale.' 32 In case of the
landholders' refusal, the land would be expropriated for a value
equal to tax value. The owner would be obligated to accept the
purchase price in no fewer than twenty annual installments, receiv-
ing five percent interest. If the owner refused to undertake the
partition and sale voluntarily, the local government could expro-
priate them.' 33
" Limitations on corporate ownership. Finally, Article 27 limited own-
ership of rural properties by commercial corporations and banks.
Commercial companies could own the lands necessary to carry out
industrial and commercial purposes, but could not own land for pur-
poses of agriculture.' 34 Banks could make loans secured by prop-
erty, but could not own more property than that strictly necessary to
carry out banking functions. 135
The Constitution of 1917 has been called a victory for the agrarians and
those who wished to restrict the influence of corporations, banks, large
landholders, and the Roman Catholic Church. Certainly, there is a tex-
tual basis for such statement, but it should not be forgotten that the docu-
ment also served as a political framework for resolving the conflicts
inherent in a broad-based revolution, and thereby adjusted its results to
suit the various factions.
130. See id.
131. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. VII(a) ("In
each State or Territory there will be established the maximum surface area of land
of which a single individual or legally constituted company may be the owner.")
(author's translation).
132. Id. sub-para. (b).
133. Id. sub-paras. (c)-(e).
134. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. IV (original
text).
135. "The Banks ... may not own or administer more real property than that strictly
necessary for their direct purpose." Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. V (author's translation).
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For example, although the nullification of all land transfers made as a
result of the legislation of the Reform era was ostensibly bold, its effect
was considerably tempered by the incorporation of the implementing
methodology of the Law of January 6, 1915. The process of restitution
became an exceedingly difficult path to pursue, and resulted in very few
awards of land during the entire 20th century. Similarly, by letting the
restitution questions be decided by local agrarian commissions and the
local governor, subject to final review by the Federal Agrarian Board
whose makeup was controlled by the president, the pace of endowments
would depend very much on the political climate in each state, as well as
the political climate in the national capital.' 36
Another example is the paucity of guidance provided on how those
ejidos who were not able to prove restitution might still be able to receive
endowments. At least the 1915 Law had placed decision-making author-
ity with local boards and governors still under revolution. Aside from
some vague references to land being taken from "immediately proxi-
mate" properties, "always respecting the rights of the small land-
holder,"' 37 the new Constitution provided very little to go on.
Finally, the key issue concerning the breakup of latifundia was essen-
tially punted to the states. Each state would determine the maximum size
of land that could be held by an individual person or corporation, and
even then the owner would have an initial opportunity to partition and
sell the excess. As we will see below, that right afforded landowners a
crucial opportunity to circumvent the law or mitigate its impact by sales
to various entities. The constitutional text did not require that land
deemed excessive be used to endow nearby poor communities or ejidos;
presumably, the excess could be sold to anyone, including family mem-
bers, associates, or newly created colonies. This is exactly what happened
in many cases. Finally, by allowing states to set maximum landholding
allowances, most large estates remained intact, because they were located
in those states least likely to pass meaningful restrictions.
D. AND A MOUSE ISSUES FORTH (1917-1934)
The fifteen years following the new Constitution was a time period
that, not coincidentally, encompassed a string of presidential administra-
tions dominated by landowning men from northern states, Sonora in par-
ticular.' 38 Very little expropriation took place, and even less restitution.
136. The governors most supportive of agrarian reform included Candido Aguilar in
Veracruz, Pascual Ortiz Rubio in Michoacan, Alfonso Cabrera in Puebla, Dom-
ingo Arrieta in Durango, and Gustavo Espinosa in Coahuila. See La Transforma-
cion Agraria, Origen, Evolucion, Retos, Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, 1 Si-croz
ARXRio 41 (1997). On the other hand, the governor of Tamaulipas simply dis-
solved the local agrarian board. See CRA11, supra note 103, at 224.
137. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. 1.
138. Venustiano Carranza, 1916-1920 (assassinated in office), from Coahuila; Adolfo de
la Huerta, 1920 (interim president after Carranza's assassination), from Sonora;
Alvaro Obregon, 1920-1924, from Sonora; Plutarco Elias Calles, 1924-1928, from
Sonora; Emilio Portes Gil (interim president after assassination of Obregon before
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During the Revolutionary decade, only 381,926 hectares would be distrib-
uted in all the country, an amount smaller than some haciendas.'39 Dur-
ing the first seven presidential administrations following the Revolution,
covering about seventeen years, the actual endowments granted by the
federal government would look like this:' 40
President Years served Hectares
Venustiano Carranza 1915-1920 (assassinated) 381,000
Adolfo de la Huerta 1920 34,000
Alvaro Obregon 1920-1924 971,000
Plutarco Elias Calles 1924-1928 3,088,000
Emilio Portes Gil 1928-1930 1,173,000
Pascual Ortiz Rubio 1930-1932 1,469,000
Abelardo Rodriguez 1932-1934 799,000
Private property was seldom the source of land turned over to ejidos.141
Millions of hectares of publicly owned lands were available and used for
such purpose.142 Included among them were (i) lands taken in foreclo-
sure by the Agrarian Credit Bank of Mexico in the years preceding the
Revolution; (ii) the "vacant lands" (terrenos baldios) in the original pos-
session of the Nation that had not been marked or staked (such as those
that were later surveyed during the Porfiriato); and (iii) national lands, a
special legal category of public lands that had been staked (therefore,
lands that have been taken out of the vacant category) and were there-
fore susceptible for conveyance to the public. It is not surprising that
agrarian commissions found endowment from these sources the preferred
path of least resistance, when compared to the process of seizing exces-
sive landholdings from enraged landowners who were willing to litigate,
and who, in some cases, hired their own thugs, called guardias blancas, to
resist seizures. Landowners were particularly enamored of the Mexican
judicial proceeding known as amparo that allowed its proponent to chal-
lenge the actions of any governmental authority, whether in the execu-
tive, judicial, or legislative branch, due to the alleged violation of a
constitutional right. With more than 100 articles in the Constitution, it
would not require a particularly astute attorney to find at least one con-
stitutional right violated by the state's action. What was particularly at-
tractive about amparo was that the proceeding could be brought in
federal court, thus countering the potential disadvantage of bringing the
taking office, and resigned from office), 1928-1930, from Tamaulipas; Pascual Ortiz
Rubio, 1930-1932, from Michoacan; Abelardo Rodriguez, 1932-1934, from Sonora.
139. La Transformacion Agraria, Origen, Evolucion, Retos, Secretariat of Agrarian Re-
form 41 (1997).
140. Octavio lanni, El Estado Capitalista en la Epoca de Cardenas, Serie Popular Era
no. 51 (1983).
141. See CIRA1I3, supra note 103, at 252-57.
142. See id.
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action before the tribunal of a state government that was almost by defi-
nition in favor of the seizure, under the mechanisms established in Article
27 and discussed above.
Claims for restitution, as opposed to outright endowment, encountered
even more obstacles. Restitution claims greatly complicated the work of
the local agrarian commissions, who would much prefer to endow an
ejido with a defined parcel of public or expropriated land (a process that
could literally be concluded in a few months) rather than spend the years
and considerable expense involved in patiently listening to the immemo-
rial stories of the local communities, many of whom relied on an oral
tradition .1 43 To paraphrase Zapata, the boundaries of indigenous parcels
seldom ran in straight lines, and it seemed that each zig and zag along a
garden wall was based on its own set of legal proofs that each proponent
seemingly wanted to vindicate. 144 The lands claimed by restitution often
overlapped the lands seized from the haciendas, claimed by the new mu-
nicipal authorities, or, claimed by neighboring communities .1 4 5 As a re-
sult, restitution as the means of fulfilling the policies of the Revolution
offered nothing other than psychological satisfaction for the communities
themselves. The period up to 1934 produced only 124 successful cases of
restitution, involving not even 1.5 million hectares, while in the same pe-
riod there were over 5,500 distinct ejidal endowments of more than 8.5
million hectares .14 6
Thus, while the extreme concentration of private landholding is always
mentioned as a leading cause of the Mexican Revolution, or at least as
the most notorious example of the worst conditions of the Porfiriato, sur-
prisingly little was actually done about it in the early 20th century. In
1930, estates with more than 1,000 hectares (almost 2,500 acres) still ac-
counted for 83.5% of all rural farmland, and estates with more than
10,000 hectares still controlled more than fifty-five percent of cultivated
land. 14 7 Two million peasants had no land at all.' 48 Two-thirds of the
great estates remained undisturbed. One eminent historian wrote,
"[f]rom absolutely no point of view could it be said that, through the
ejido, the governments of the era would have proposed to eliminate the
143. For a thorough and exhaustive description of such tradition, and the ways in which
it was brought to bear upon many proceedings to determine and delineate land
tenure, see GRAIIn, supra note 103, at 224.
144. "You engineers sometimes get stuck on straight lines, but the boundary is going to
be the stone fence, even if you have to work six months measuring all the ins and
Outs.."JOHN WOMACK, ZAPATA ANL) THlE ME~XICAN RE-voi-uTION 227 (1968)
(quoting Zapata).
145. CRAH3, supra note 103, at 244-46.
146. Everardo Escarcega Lopez, El Principio de la Reforma Agraria, 5 HISTroRIA DE L'A
Cue--S-n-N AG;RARIA MEXICANA 39, 69 (1990).
147. Las Transformaciones del Cardenismo, Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, http://
www.sra.gob.mx/sraweb/conoce-la-sra/historia/las-transformaciones-del-carden-
ismo/.
148. Thbomas Benjamin, Rebuilding the Nation, in OxiroRD His'roizy OF MEXICO 467,
490 (2000).
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great estates."1149
Even worse-from the standpoint of the Revolution's announced
objectives-much of the public land distributed during this era, including
some of the best, was not given to ejidos, but to private entities, primarily
those formed to avail themselves of the generous benefits of several new
colonization laws. The public lands distributed to ejidos were often
poor.'50 By 1930, of the 7.6 million hectares that had been distributed,
only twenty-three percent were under cultivation.' 5' Ejidos were in pos-
session of only thirteen percent of total irrigated land.' 52 The northern
states were also the home states of most of the Mexican presidents of this
era, who viewed farmland in an agricultural rather than agrarian light, as
the instruments of economic progress rather than social harmony. To in-
crease productivity, it was necessary to achieve scale in farm operations,
bring in expertise, and lend money. The first of these goals could be ac-
complished, at the state level, by generous definitions of small ownership.
In addition, new programs promoted mass colonization of both public
and private lands, even by foreigners.' 53 The Colonization Act,154 for ex-
ample, authorized not only the partition and colonization of public lands,
but allowed private landowners-perhaps wishing to avoid their excess
lands being allotted to an ejido-to do so as well. The era also saw new
legislation designed to provide agricultural infrastructure and credit. A
large portion of these facilities helped larger-scale irrigation and distribu-
tion projects in the presidents' home states.' 55
The Ley de Bancos Refaccionarios,56 a law passed in the early 1920s
whose purpose was to facilitate farm credit, did not even mention the
words ejido or communal farming, and by requiring that bank loans made
for the purpose of purchasing seed, machinery, labor, etc., be secured by
a mortgage on the property, made it virtually impossible to extend its
benefits to communal farmers. The Irrigation Act (Ley de Irrigacion),
intended to promote infrastructural projects, applied by its own terms ex-
149. LOREINZO ME-yE R, HISTORIA DEi LA REVOLUCION MErXICANA. Ei. CONFLic]tO SO-
CiAL Y L OS GOBIFRNOS D131 MAXIMATO, VOL. 13 188 (2000).
150. ENRIQUE~ KRAUZE E~T AL., HISTORIA D)E L A RE-VOI UCION MFXICANA, 1924-1928:
LA RECONSTRUCCION ECONOMICA 117 (1981). The "Ley de Tierra Libre," or
Open Lands Act, enacted August 2, 1923, and suspended in 1926, was a short-lived
exception; it extended the right of all Mexicans needing land to homestead
"1empty" or "national" lands not reserved to the Nation.
151. Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, supra note 147.
152. Id.
153. Alvaro Obregon, president of Mexico from 1920-1924, and from the state of So-
nora, would demonstrate a marked preference for endowing colonies (subject to
small landholding limits, and owning in fee simple), composed of foreign colonists.
From the very richest excess lands expropriated from the Zuluoga hacienda alone,
he gave one-half million hectares to Mennonite immigrants, while endowing ejidos
in the same state a total of 116,000 hectares in his entire administration. See Lo-
pez, supra note 146, at 59.
154. Ley de Colonizaci6n [Colonization Act], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 5
de Abril de 1926 (Mex.) [hereinafter Colonization Act].
155. I3ETIIEI , supra note 17, at 238.
156. Ley de Bancos Refaccionarios [Crop Loans Act], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
[D.O.I, 29 de Septiembre de 1924 (Mex.).
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clusively to private owners.157
E. THE EJIDO EMERGES
The 1917 Constitution was vague in defining the process by which those
ejidos that were unable to prove entitlement to land in restitution pro-
ceedings might otherwise qualify for endowment. As long as there was
vacant or public land to give ejidos in the 1920s, precise rules were not
necessary. But by the early 1930s, it became increasingly apparent that
the aspirations of the populace could only be satisfied from the excess
lands held by large estates and haciendas.
Despite not much having been done to implement the 1917 Constitu-
tional principles in a concrete way, several key features of an agrarian
program did take shape in this period, without which Lazaro Cardenas,
who would be elected president in 1934, and who took ejido endowment
seriously, as we shall see below, would not have been able to accomplish
as much as he did. First among these was the Law of Ejidal Parcel Es-
tates (Ley del Patrimonio Parcelario Ejidal).158 This act, in particular, es-
tablished the rules of ejidal governance and, even more importantly, the
rules governing the State's ability to expropriate private lands to endow
ejidos. While these rules would be amended from time to time, they
served to establish the basic framework for the agrarian program for most
the Twentieth Century. They are summarized here.
1. Governance
The basic question of exactly who could collectively benefit from land
endowment had been over-answered in the 1917 Constitution, to the
point where it was not. The original text of the 1917 Constitution, refer-
ring to villages, hamlets, and communities ("pueblos, rancherias, y
comunidades"), could conceivably encompass any rural life form other
than a hermit's cave. 159 While some of these descriptors were excised in
subsequent constitutional amendments, and other phrases (like the not
very poetic "nucleuses of population") added,' 60 the reality remained
that qualification was largely a matter of imagination, and therefore
discretion. 16'
157. Ley de Irrigacion [Irrigation Act] Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 4 de
Enero de 1926 (Mex.).
158. Ley del Patrimonjo Parcelario Ejidal [Ejidal Parcel Estates Act], Diario Oficial de
la Federaci6n [D.O.J, 25 de Agosto de 1927 (Mex.) (replacing an earlier law of the
same name enacted in 1925 under the same Calles administration).
159. See Constitucion Politica. de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27 § VIII(a).
160. Id.
161. One of the rare pieces of legislation that excluded places from consideration as
recipients of ejidal endowments was the Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de
Tierras y Aguas of March 21, 1929 (Law of Endowment and Restitution of Lands
and Waters), whose article 14 excluded (i) the federal or state capitals, (ii) popula-
tion centers of more than 10,000 inhabitants among whom less than 200 were eligi-
ble to receive endowments pursuant to the "agrarian census," (iii) any population
center with fewer than twenty such eligible inhabitants, (iv) ports carrying on high-
seas traffic, and (v) population centers formed within accredited colonies.
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If distinctions were not made in terms of place, some were made in
terms of the people who would be considered as members of the ejido.
Excluded, at least in the early going, were peones acasillados, literally
house peons, those who worked on haciendas and were normally pro-
vided their residences, together with a small garden plot, for free. 162 Per-
haps such exclusion was due to the feeling that such persons were not
those most in need of material help. Perhaps it was due to the political
pressure exerted by hacendados who needed their workers. Perhaps it
was due to the reality that, prior to the mid-1930s, haciendas had re-
mained intact, and were carrying on business as usual. This exclusion was
eliminated in the Cardenas administration.16 3
The governance of ejidos was designed mainly to be internal, with the
agencies of the federal government involved in a support role to monitor
and, in announced cases, certify acts taken by the various internal organs
of the ejido (e.g., decisions by assemblies). 164 Ejidos would be internally
governed much like a business corporation: major or organic decisions
would be in the hands of ejido members, meeting from time to time in
assemblies, with the day-to-day affairs and representation of the ejido
handled by a smaller commission (comisariado) elected by the assembly.
An agrarian registry was established to permanently record such deci-
sions, as well as significant actions.165
Ejidos could elect to hold, work, and enjoy all ejidal land as truly col-
lective, but few chose this option.166 Most opted for the mixed regime
under which land in the ejido would be assigned to one of three general
categories: (i) the land dedicated to services benefiting all ejido mem-
bers, like schools, clinics, or meeting halls; (ii) communal agricultural
land, usually pastoral; and (iii) agricultural land, usually cultivated, that
could be divided into parcels assigned to individual ejido members.' 67
The parcelarios (parcel holders) could hold their parcel for the remainder
162. See Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas, art. 14 (IV). This
article defined "house peons" as "those individuals who live without charge in a
house constructed within the confines of the hacienda. .. .and whose means of sub-
sistence habitually depend on the day-wage or salary they may receive for labors
related to cultivation." In addition, article 16 of the same legislation excluded cer-
tain types of people from receiving ejidal parcels: (i) those with existing land
greater than the parcel to be given, (ii) those with more than 2,500 pesos in any
kind of capital, (iii) federal or state employees, (iv) those earning more than sev-
enty-five pesos per month in salary, or (v) members of the "professions."
163. LRAN Backgrounder, Mexico's Land Reform: The Modification of Article 27, at
24, available at http://www.landaction.org/gallery/MexicoBack.doc.pdf.
164. See Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidlos Mexicanos, art. 27 § XI.
165. See JOHN Pirrr-oN DENNIS, Ejido Property, in How -ro Buy REM- ESTiATE IN
WMXCO 3 (2006), available at http://www.lawmexico.com/articles/Ejido /2OProp-
erty.pdf.
166. The only era in which wholly communal ejidos were widely operated was in the
1930s, during the Cardenas administration, an era that corresponded to some of
the highest gains in productivity. Commencing in the 1940s, ejidos became in-
creasingly parcelized. See BE-IHELL, supra note 17, at 259, 261. This may suggest
that agrarian productivity, at least in this case, depended less on individual owner-
ship and more on the whole-hearted backing of the administration in office.
167. Ejidal Estates Act, art. 16.
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of their lives and, in fact, pass on their rights to their heirs, but did not
enjoy typical ownership rights in any other sense. They could not sell,
rent, or mortgage their land.' 68 If they failed to till their respective parcel
for more than one year, their rights could be forfeited. 169 This restriction
later became particularly detrimental because it could penalize tempo-
rary emigration to the United States.
Both the ejidos, collectively, and the parcelario with respect to his or
her individual parcel, were also prohibited from entering into any con-
tractual arrangement with an outside party, be it the renting of land, or
joint cooperative agreements. 170
The original objective of the January 6, 1915 Act and Article 27 of the
Constitution of 1917, making communal ownership a temporary measure
on the way to full, fee ownership of land for Mexico's poor farmers, got
no further than in this ability to assign certain parcels to individual ejido
members, and in that ability it was entombed. There would be nothing
provisional about the social sector: land would come into it, and never
leave.
Perhaps worst of all, the policy makers of the 1920s and 1930s, in deter-
mining the amount of land necessary for ejido endowment, began to re-
late the amount of land that should be given to each parcel owner to the
amount of income it could generate.' 7'
Initially, two days of wages seemed right. At a surface level, the ability
to earn two days' of wages in one day had appeal. The problem was that
the policy was based on a conception of wages that barely kept people
alive, and, in establishing an income floor, it established an income ceil-
ing. To illustrate, if a member was given, say, four hectares (correspond-
ing to the amount of land necessary to produce twice the perceived daily
wages), he or she was doomed never to do better, assuming no substantial
changes in agricultural productivity-and it is difficult to imagine any in-
crease in productivity in farming four hectares of land, without the bene-
fit of normal financing to purchase machinery or fertilizer, or
infrastructure. By 1942, this policy was incorporated into an official pro-
gram (unidad de dotacion individual); the amount given to each member
was increased from four to six hectares of irrigated land (1942 amend-
ments to Agrarian Law), and to ten hectares in 1947.172 Nevertheless, the
average parcel was and remains today about five hectares, with about
two-thirds of the total campesino population in possession of three
168. See, e.g., Ejidal Estates Act, art. 20(11).
169. See Ejidal Estates Act, art. 20(V) (one year limit for non-cultivation).
170. Id. sub-sections (11) and (11l) of art. 20.
171. One law from this period, the Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de las Tierras y
Aguas, set the following limits on parcel size: 3 to 5 hectares, for irrigated land; 4
to 6 hectares, for land with abundant rainfall; 6 to 10 hectares, for land with scarcer
rainfall; up to 24 hectares, in good pastureland for the raising of cattle; and up to
48 hectares for pasturage in arid lands.
172. Una Nueva Estrategia, Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, http://www.sra.gob.mxl
sraweb/conoce-la-sralhistoria/una-nueva-estrategia (last visited July 11, 2010).
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hectares.173
Since neither the ejido, collectively, nor the parcelaric, with respect to
his or her individual parcel, could mortgage land, an interesting question
arose as to how seed and machinery could he procured. Only at certain
times would there be a realistic answer to this question. It is to be as-
sumed that no private bank provided loans to ejido members or to ejidos.
Various forms of government-run rural credit banks were established to
provide limited credit to ejidal farmers, secured by a limited lien upon the
crops to be produced.' 74 Not surprisingly, the only period in which such
schemes achieved even a modicum of success was during the Cardenas
administration.
2. Expropriable Lands
By the 1930s, the rules were being worked out for determining which
private land was susceptible to expropriation to endow ejidos. This sus-
ceptibility, i.e., vulnerability to expropriation, became coded into the
Mexican legal lexicon in the words afectacion, or afectabilidad, whose cor-
respondence to the English cognates "affection" or "affected," began to
slip away decades ago. For this reason, "expropriability," though not re-
ally English, is used here, with apology. From the 1930s on, private land-
owners would care mightily whether their parcels were or were not
expropriable. The following provides a summary of those rules.
*First and foremost, the legislation of the late 1920s and early 1930s
hewed to the original constitutional concept that endowments would
come "from immediately proximate properties, always respecting the
rights of the small landowner."'175 The legislation attempted to define
the meaning of "immediately proximate property," and "the small
landowner."
Article 21 of the Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas
(Law of Endowments and Restitutions of Lands and Waters) defined
"proximate estates" (fincas proximas) as "those which, whether or not
bordering the subject population, has all or part of its lands located within
a distance of seven kilometers starting from where the urban zone of the
population terminates.~" 76 Thbus, large estates outside of the seven-kilo-
meter radius were not necessarily expropriable, and their mere ownership
(until 1992) was not per se illegal. Additionally, the seven-kilometer rule
was interpreted in a manner very favorable to the hacendados: the rule
did not apply to communities completely enclosed within the boundaries
173. La Iniciativa, Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, http://www.sra.gob.mx/sraweb/co-
noce-la-sra/historia/la-iniciatival (last visited July 11, 2010).
174. Under the Ley del Patrimonio Ejidal, while liens to secure indebtedness were pro-
hibited upon the ejido parcel, itself, indebtedness incurred to provide food to the
debtor and his family might be secured by a lien on up to eighty-five percent of the
value of the harvested crops. Ejidal Estates Act, art. 21.
175. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. 1.
176. Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas , art. 21.
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of an existing hacienda.177
Although the original Constitution had delegated to the states respon-
sibility for setting small landholder limits, by the late 1920's and early
1930's safe-harbors began creeping into federal legislation, and by 1947
the limits became defined at the federal level by constitutional amend-
ments. The Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas, cited
above, for example, excluded either: (i) some lands that had been distrib-
uted under the Lerdo Law, or (ii) up to 50 hectares held under conditions
of adverse possession (more than 10 years). 178 That legislation also ex-
empted defined smallholdings based upon the familiar tiered system: 150
hectares for irrigated land, 180 hectares for land with abundant rainfall,
etc.17 9 The maximum sizes were variable, depending on whether the land
was irrigated or depended on rainfall, or on the type of crop grown, or on
whether the land was used for crop cultivation or the raising of livestock.
The "base rate" to this tiered system, that is, the cap placed on irrigated
land used to grow a staple crop like cotton or corn, was set at 100 hect-
ares by the constitutional amendment of 1947, and has not been raised
since.180
Regardless of the protections afforded by such legislation, the fortunes
of large landowners were often determined by the judicial mechanisms
available to them to assert or defend rights. Article 10 of the Law of
January 6, 1915, discussed above, had given private landowners the right
to go to federal tribunals, and to use the amparo proceeding, both ex-
tremely valuable assets. By the late 1920s, such rights were severely cur-
tailed. A 1932 law amending article 10 now stated that "lands affected by
ejido endowments or restitutions... .had no rights or legal recourse either
through ordinary [proceedings] or through extraordinary amparo [pro-
ceedings]."'181 The landholder's sole remedy was to argue the amount of
indemnity to be paid for the expropriation before the federal govern-
ment.182 Just to spare one from arguing that such a deprivation of due
process was unconstitutional, the law was followed by a 1934 amendment
to Article 27. The ban effectively stripped landowners of ability to con-
test expropriation.'18 3 A 1947 amendment to Article 27 restored amparo,
but only to litigants whose lands had been certified as compliant, pursu-
ant to a certificate of nun-expropriability (certificado de no afectacion)
issued by what was then called the Agrarian Department (Departamento
177. Modesto Aguilar Alvarado, supra note 79, at 65.
178. Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas, art. 25.
179. Id. art. 26.
180. Id. art. 27 § XV. Other examples of maximum limitations are: (i) cotton on irri-
gated land, 150 hectares; (ii) where the source of water is natural rainfall, the limits
corresponding to irrigated lands is doubled; (iii) forestry, 800 hectares; (iv) cattle-
raising, the amount of land needed to raise 500 head of cattle, as determined by
the local department of the federal agricultural authority.
181. Decreto que reforma el articulo 10 de la Ley Agraria del 6 de enero de 1915 [De-
cree amending article 10 of the Agrarian Law of January 6, 1915] D.O. Jan. 15,
1932.
182. Id.
183. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27, Para. 1.
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Agrario). 18
In addition, smallholding did not always afford a complete guarantee
against expropriation. If it was found that the amount of expropriable
land within the seven-kilometer radius was insufficient for the needs of
the ejido, the non-expropriable size of the smallholding could be reduced
by one-third.'18 5 Thus, the owner of, say, eighty acres of irrigated farm-
land (otherwise within the 100 hectare limit of smallholding) was not
completely secure. To the extent a population was recognized within
seven kilometers of his or her farm, upon a finding of insufficiency of
available land to endow the ejido, perhaps only 66 2/3 hectares might re-
main non-expropriable. Since an ejido could theoretically be formed
from any nucleus of population, smallholders had no real assurance
against expropriation until certificates of non-expropriability became
available for such purpose in 1947.
Changes of land use presented another problem because smallholder
limits were set according to whether the land was irrigated, whether it
grew sugar cane or barley, or whether it was used for pasture, and so
on. 186 It soon became apparent that a farmer, who might otherwise wish
to boost productivity by converting rain-fed land to irrigated land, might
not do so because part of his lands might become subject to expropria-
tion. Laws were eventually passed that retained the greater smaliholding
limit prior to the use conversion.
Finally, large-scale farming activities involving a high degree of
processing or industrial activity, such as sugar cane, hennequin, banana,
cocoa, and maguey plantations, had their limits set by National Agrarian
Commission in accordance with the "technical capacity of the plant
[industria] "1187
3. Other Measures Used to Avoid Expropriation
Colonization as a means of accomplishing the Mexican ideal of yeoman
smallholding continued to be popular, particularly in the less populated
northern part of the country. The Colonization Act (Ley de Coloniza-
cion)'881 made public lands, and lands that had been foreclosed upon by
the Banco Nacional de Credito Agricola, available for colonization, but it
also allowed any private owner to develop a colony without participation
of any governmental entity.189 Colonists could be, and often were, for-
eigners' 90 who were eligible with no other requirement than agreement
to the Calvo Clause' 9' and payment of a $1,000 per family deposit that
184. See Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27 § XIV.
185. Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas, art. 27.
186. See Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 27 § XV.
187. Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas, art. 36(11).
188. Colonization Act.
189. Id arts. 2, 3.
190. Id. art. 9
191. Id
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could be used immediately to defray operating expenses. 192 Lot sizes
could range from 5 to 150 hectares,' 93 in the case of irrigated land, from
15 to 250 hectares in cultivated land with abundant rainfall,194 and even
larger tracts in other cases. 195 Lots could be purchased with a down pay-
ment of only five percent which could be deferred and paid from the
proceeds of the first harvest, even later if those proceeds were insuffi-
cient.196 Most importantly, the size of each colonized parcel was deter-
mined by the more generous small landholder limits described above, not
the ejidal single parcel limit.' 97 Neither benefit was available to the mem-
ber of an ejido. Since new colonies could come from private lands, and
be organized by private landowners, colonization became a way around
the possible forced expropriation of excessive landholdings to endow
ejidos. The federal government also did its part to promote and occasion-
ally favor colonization. From 1917 to 1934, it gave 1.5 million hectares of
national lands to private landholders rather than ejidos.198 During the
administrations of Miguel Alemnan (1946-1952), Adolfo Ruiz Cortnines
(), and Rodolfo Lopez Mateos (the government's agrarian policy shifted
notably in favor of endowing colonies rather than ejidos, particularly in
what concerned land with access to irrigation in the northern states of
Sonora and Baja California, to the extent that, by 1962, article 58 of the
Agrarian Law ( was amended "to prevent owners of surface areas greater
than that permitted by agrarian law [that is, applicable to ejidos] from
evading agrarian distribution through colonization."' 99
Even with these allowances, large landholders resisted expropriation,
often through the simple expedient of voluntarily selling excessive parcels
to family members, friends, and various straw men. While such transfers
are routinely voidable in more advanced legal systems, the Mexican legal
system had not, until recently, developed meaningful legislation designed
to invalidate sham, fraudulent, or otherwise voidable transactions. 200
While it was widely assumed that large landowners were using such de-
vice to avoid or preempt forced expropriations, the only legal counter-
192. Id. art. 11.
193. Id. art. 8 (this law was passed before the smallholding limit was federalized).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. art. 11.
197. And even when small landholding limits became set by federal legislation, such as
the Ley de Dotaciones y Restitucions de Tierras y Aguas, supra, the small land-
owner limit applicable to parcels in colonies were set at whatever they may have
been pursuant to the legislation that created them (see art. 26( VII)), even if the
smallholding limits applicable generally were exceeded.
198. Eyler N. Simpson, El Ejido: Unica Salida Para Mexico, in PROBLEMAS AG'RICOL-AS
Y INDUSTRIAL17S DE ME-XICO [PROBLE~MS IN MEXICAN AcRICUiLTURE ANI) INIDUS-
TRY] vol. 44 (1952).
199. Una Nueva Estrategia, supra note 172.
200. E.g., the recent Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law that voids fraudulent transfers,
using many of the same concepts (payment of inadequate purchase price) common
in U.S. law. The civil codes adopted in each Mexican state contain provisions re-
garding fraudulent transactions, but they are rather toothless and have seldom
been used to invalidate a transfer of property.
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measure used against it was the rule that invalidated any transfers made
after a formal application for ejidal restitution or endowment had been
submitted, and denied recognition to transfers made prior to submission
of the application if not recorded in the public registry of property.201
F. COMES CARDENAS
By the mid-1930s, the legal and political conditions were in place for a
marked increase in the amount of lands being transferred into what be-
came known as the social sector. It was not just the political effects of the
Great Depression that tended to make people question the promise of
the market system. Mexico's poor farmers had been so miserable prior to
the Great Depression that a change towards the worse might well have
gone unnoticed. What was changing was the political landscape: Political
parties and other quasi-governmental organizations were becoming "in-
stitutionalized. 202 The men on horseback who won battles in the 1910s,
and became presidents in the 1920s, were dying out, replaced by men who
not only ran the new organizations but made their livings doing so. It will
be remembered that the 1917 Constitution allowed states to determine
the pace of agrarian reform within their own jurisdictions. In the states
where such reform was most advanced, permanent political organizations
sprang up that eventually joined to form national apparatuses. By 1934,
Plutarco Elias Calles, the former president (1924-1928) who was acknowl-
edged as running a de facto presidency (called the "maximato") during
the terms of his three successors, would become so frustrated by the atti-
tudes of these new political professionals that he would leave Mexico in
disgust. He once told a reporter, "'I was exiled .. , because I opposed the
attempts to implant a dictatorship of the proletariat." 2 03
The pronounced change could also be attributed to a man. Lazaro Car-
denas was not a rancher from Sonora, or Coahuila, but from the central,
more traditional state of Michoacan, and, to judge him by the opinions of
his contemporaries, held the ideals of the Revolution-particular those of
Zapata-closer to his heart. In governing his home state, his reputation
for probity earned him the name "Boy Scout" (a sobriquet not always
meant as a compliment in Mexico). 204
Elected as president in 1934, Cardenas's agrarian policies struck early
and hard. Instead of giving away relatively infertile land in the northern
reaches of the country, he ordered the mass expropriations of fertile
lands like those in a region called the Laguna around the city of Torreon
(150,000 hectares given to 35,000 peons), the henequen plantations in the
Yucatan (366,000 hectares to 34,000 peons), a fertile area in the state of
Sonora called the "Valle del Yaqui" (47,000 hectares to 2,160 peons), in
Lombardia and Nueva Italia in the State of Michoacan (61,449 hectares
201. Ley de Dotaciones y Restituciones de Tierras y Aguas, art. 29.
202. I3FTHELL, supra note 17, at 244.
203. Benjamin, supra note 148, at 478.
204. BETHELL, supra note 17, at 249.
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to 2,066 peons), and irrigated sugar cane fields near Los Mochis, Sinaloa
(55,000 hectares to 3,500 peons). 205 While an estimated 942,125 campesi-
nos were endowed in all the years prior to Cardenas, in his single term of
office 771,640 were endowed.206 More importantly, ejidos were given
better lands. The portion of cultivated lands (tierra de labor) held by
ejidos rose from 13.3% to 46.5 %.207 By the end of his term, ejidos repre-
sented almost fifty percent of total agricultural production in Mexico, a
figure never again duplicated.208
Nor was the Cardenas administration content to leave undisturbed the
understandings laboriously achieved with foreign oil companies on Bu-
careli Street. The Nation's ownership of in-the-ground oil assets would
have to be restored, but this time the Cardenas administration found a
way around the politically difficult route of direct expropriation of sub-
surface real property. By adroitly managing labor confrontations be-
tween the companies and their labor unions, followed by the companies'
refusal to honor the decisions of the labor authorities, a pretext for con-
fiscation was found, and followed. 209
G. AFTrERMATH
True to his word, Cardenas did not provoke another constitutional cri-
sis by attempting to run for a second term. The year 1940 would mark the
conclusion of what might be called the revolutionary or post-revolution-
ary phases of agrarian reform in Mexico. While additional lands would
be distributed to the social sector, particularly in the 1960s and early
1970s, the whole idea of land as a means of achieving social better-
ment-basically, as a solution for the Mexican peasant and widespread
poverty-would never have the same importance.
Perhaps one reason was the diminishing role of land as the touchstone
of the economy. A law passed in 1934 could call agricultural land "the
supreme cornerstone" of wealth, but fewer and fewer of Mexico's poor,
emigrating to the cities in the 1940s and 1950s to work in the new facto-
ries, would believe this was true. World War 11 created an opportunity
for Mexico to send products, crops, and farm workers to the United
States to fill the holes and new requirements created in the U.S. war
economy. In the 1940s, Mexico's industrial production grew eight per-
cent per year; in the 1950s, the annual increase was seven percent. 210
Agrarian policy was replaced by industrial policy, a policy that turned
increasingly coddling towards its national producers, including commer-
205. Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, supra note 147.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. David Yetman, Ejidos, Land Sales, and Free Trade in Northwest Mexico: Will
Globalization Affect the Commons?, at 4, available at https://journals.ku.edu/index.
php/amerstud/article/viewFile/31 09/3068.
209. See Benjamin, supra note 148, at 478.
210. CLARK WINSTON REYNOLDS, THE MEXICAN ECONOMY: Twuimeru-H CENTURY
STRUCTrURE AND: GROW-ni 166 (1970).
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cial crop producers, and increasingly indifferent to peasants tilling corn
with oxen, five hectares at a time.
From 1940 to the mid-1960s, agriculture in general grew at an average
annual rate of four percent, well above the rate of population growth in
that period, but the social sector received little public support.21' By
1960, 50 percent of agricultural properties contributed to only four per-
cent of production.212 Much of the rate of growth occurred in the coun-
tryside, in a period (late 1960s) preceding the creation of new
employment programs (e.g., the twin-plant, or maquiladora program pri-
marily along the U.S. border), and mass emigrations to the United States.
The first response of the Mexican government to these demographic pres-
sures was to endow new ejido lands rather than try to correct its inherent
problems or abolish the program altogether. The Diaz Ordaz administra-
tion, in particular (1968-1974), distributed more new land to the ejido sec-
tor that any previous administration since Cardenas.213
The results of simply expanding the scope of a failed policy in order to
mitigate its defects were predictable. By the 1980s, Mexico began to im-
port corn for the first time, an event that shook the country that had
basically perfected its cultivation.214 Mexico's 20th century land program
also came to be viewed not just as a failure, but the very special kind of
failure brought about by the very principles it embodied. By capping
ejidal parcels at ten hectares per farmer, and precluding access to credit,
or participation with the outside world, rural poverty was not alleviated,
it was institutionalized.
1I1. NOW
The issue of land redistribution had emerged from the Mexican
Revolution as an enshrined, if under-achieved, ideal of Mexican politics,
but towards the end of the 20th century several factors came together
that would enable Mexican leaders to fashion an exit from what was
clearly a failed policy. First, the worldwide tendency to privatize state-
owned assets and businesses, to open markets, and to liberalize the econ-
omy-a broad movement described as neo-liberalism-took strong hold in
Mexico, particularly during the administration of Carlos Salinas de
Gortari (1988-1994). Mexico acceded to the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (1986).215 It negotiated a North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada that became
211. See Auge y Crisis Agropecuario, Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria [Secretariat of
Agrarian Reform], http://www.sra.gob.mx/sraweb/conoce-la-sra/historia/auge-y-
crisis-agropecuaria! (last visited June 7, 2010).
212. Id.
213. See Merilee S. Grindle, Reforming Land Tenure in Mexico: Peasants, the Market,
and the State, in TIF CHALLENGE 0OF INS-1ITUTIONAi- REF-ORM IN MEXIco 42
(Riordan Roett, ed., 1995).
214. Mexico: Grain Production, Encyclopedia of the Nations, http://www.country-data.
comlcgi-binlquerylr-8744.htmi (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
215. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
ll, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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effective in 1994.216 Major industrial and commercial sectors opened to
private and foreign participation (telecommunications, natural gas distri-
bution, railroads, banks). NAFL'A, in particular, imposed a new logic on
the agricultural sector. In theory at least, Mexicans would import more
of those products in which U.S. and Canadian farmers enjoyed a competi-
tive advantage (e.g., grains), and export those products in which they en-
joyed a competitive advantage (e.g., broccoli, seasonal lettuce and
tomatoes, avocados, tropical fruit). This logic did not augur well for low-
productivity ejido farming which focused on corn and bean production.
Second, it was politically possible to point out that the purely political
objectives of the Revolution had been achieved. By 1990, the great lati-
fundia had been reduced (although large ranches were not hard to find, if
one looked), and ejidos owned about 100 million hectares of real estate,
almost one-half of the entire country, and the Mexican government
could report that "if in 1900 less than 2,000 families were owners of 87%
of the surface area of the country, by the end of the 1980s there were
more than five million members of ejidos, communes, and small land-
holders with direct control over 90% of the territory. 217
But, perhaps most importantly, the grandchildren and great-grandchil-
dren of the peones, who had clamored for their bit of land 100 years ago,
were no longer there but in Dallas working in construction, in Iowa dis-
emboweling poultry, or in Ciudad Juarez assembling auto parts.218 Con-
versely, Mexican cities had swelled during the population boom of the
late 20th century, and were now rubbing up against ejidos at several sub-
urban points. Foreign investment created a demand for industrial parks;
foreign tourists and home buyers created a demand for more beachfront;
and, in almost all cases, it was difficult to find large pieces of developable
land that did not encompass an ejido. If given a choice, would the ejido
member living and working in Chicago prefer to sell his five-hectare par-
cel to Canadian sun-seekers or enter into a production-sharing arrange-
ment with Green Giant, or would he rather return to his family parcel to
eke out a subsistence living?
The politically astute response, embodied in a completely new Agra-
rian Law enacted in 1992, with accompanying changes to Article 27 of the
Constitution, approached the issue from several directions.219 First, the
decision to privatize a particular ejido remained completely voluntary
among its members; this made it impossible for any ejido to claim it was
being railroaded by an outside entity.2 20 Second, even when the ejido had
216. See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can-.Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 l.L.M. 289 (1993).
217. La Iniciativa, Secretariat of Agrarian Reform, http://www.sra.gob.mx/sraweb/co-
noce-la-sralhistorialla-iniciativa.
218. Id.
219. Ley Agraria [Agrarian Act], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 26 de Febrero
de 1992 (Mex.).
220. Procuraduria Agraria [Office of the Federal Agrarian Attorney General],
"Procede" (monograph), http://www.pa.gob.mx/publica/pa070113.htm.
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opted for the privatization route, the decision to privatize effectively re-
mained at the level of the individual parcel holder, who could choose
among several options: privatize and hold, privatize and sell, or not priva-
tize at all. 221 Third, in the event such owner of a now privatized parcel
decided to sell to an outside entity, the collective interests of fellow ejido
members were safeguarded somewhat by a preferential right to
purchase. 222 In any case, it was the individual seller, not the State, who
would reap the economic benefits of the sale. Fourth, old rules that re-
quired an ejido parcel to be continuously worked by the parcel owner, at
the risk of losing it,223 were abolished, thus extending the benefits of the
program to hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of gmigr&s ejido mem-
bers, a detail that virtually guaranteed its political acceptance. Finally,
ejidos, and ejido parcel owners who did not wish to go all the way with
privatization, but who desired the expertise or capital of outside parties,
were now tree to enter into almost any kind of development agreement
with such entities.224
A. LAYING OUT THE BOUNDARIES
As the new Agrarian Law was passed, it was recognized that its liberal-
izing tendencies could not be implemented without addressing serious de-
ficiencies in the legal descriptions not only of the lands originally given to
ejidos, but of the internal divisions of lands within the ejidos, themselves.
Establishing the external boundaries of the ejido would have been nec-
essary whether the new Agrarian Law was passed or not. By the end of
the 20th century, the edges of many cities had pushed up to the edges of
many ejidos,225 and rights had to be delineated with precision. In the fifty
years after the Mexican Revolution, both public and private lands had
been distributed to 28,000 ejidos with breath-taking disregard for the es-
sential points of legal conveyances or land surveying. One example is an
endowment in which an ejido was given all land within a certain radius of
a certain point on the earth's surface.226 It is hard to imagine how a pe-
rimeter described by a geometric circle would address existing realities,
or serve future needs. This perfect circle did, indeed, encroach on several
privately owned tracts that were never intended to be disturbed. For the
same reason, it left huge gaps between the circle and existing parcels,
221. Agrarian Act, infra notes 250-59.
222. Agrarian Act, art. 84.
223. See, e.g., Ejidal Estates Act, art. 20(V) that subjected ejido parcels left uncultivated
more than one year to forfeiture.
224. See Agrarian Act, art. 45.
225. Gareth A. Jones & Peter M. Ward, Privatizing the Commons: Reforming the Ejido
and Urban Development in Mexico, at 78, available at http://www.uky.edu/
.-tmute2/mexico/Mex%/20PDFs/Jones-warcl-private-commons.pdf.226. Based on the author's personal examination of the map attached to the 1964 presi-
dential decree endowing the Ejido Colonel Esteban Cantu. By coincidence, the
endowment was the same one that caused scores of Americans, who had presuma-
bly purchased land near Punta Banda, south of the city of Ensenada, Baja Califor-
nia, to be evicted en masse.
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creating lagunas. The predictable result was decades of needless litiga-
tion and in the end, the intervention of the Mexican Supreme Court.227
By the same token the internal divisions made within ejido land needed
better delineation because of the manner in which the new legislation
would stage the process of privatizing the ejido. Certain plots within the
ejido might never be privatized, others could be used but not owned by
outsiders, others still could be completely privatized eventually.
The program that would be created to address these deficiencies was
called "PROCEDE," the initials for Pro grama de Certificaci6n de Der-
echos Ejidales y Titulaci6n de Solares (Program for the Certification of
Ejidal Rights and Titling of Urban Plots) 2 2 8 Participation in the program
was voluntary and at no cost to the ejido.229 Although the initial partici-
pation by ejidos was much less than expected, by 2006 more than ninety
percent of all ejidos and communes had become certified. 230
The benefit of PROCEDE is that it provided a practical mechanism
and the resources for resolving boundary disputes in a relatively expedi-
tious manner. For example, the governmental agencies charged with the
program would literally bring ejido members together with adjacent pri-
vate landowners, walk the fences, agree on boundaries, and enter into a
binding agreement that would then be reflected in boundary maps kept in
a formal registry. While this process did not always end happily, it was
far superior to any process that had come before it.
B. CATEGORIES OF EJIDo LAND
Ejido land is divided into three categories:
* Land used for "human settlements" (asentamientos hurnanos) is the
portion of the ejido set aside for houses, schools, and the other facili-
ties of everyday life. 23 '
" Another is common use (uso cornun), the land used in common for
the economic sustenance of all the ejido; it is usually land used for
grazing.232
" The principle of individual use and benefit is reflected in parcels
227. Supreme Court Orders Return of Ejido Land to Original Owners, All Business
(Dun & Bradstreet), Nov. 1, 2000, http://www.allbusiness.com/north-america/mex-
ico/659922-1 .html.
228. PROCEDE is generally described in: "Procede" supra note 220; Ana de Ita, Land
Concentration in Mexico after PROCEDE, PROMISED LAND: COMPIrNG VISIONS
OF AGRARIAN RiEFIORM 148-164 (2006).
229. Office of the Presidency of the Republic, "PROCEDE," http://www.contigo.gob.
mxlindex.php?idseccion-12&programa-id=31.
230. Ruben Aguilar Valenzuela, Presidential Spokesperson, El Secretario de la Reforma
Agraria, durante el ejercicio de transparencia y rendici6n de cuentas del Gobierno
Federal de cara al Sexto Informe de Gobierno del Presidente Fox [The Secretary of
Agrarian Reform during the exercise in transparency and accountability of the
Federal Government towards the Sixth Report of the Government of President
Fox] (Aug. 4, 2006) (Mex.), available at http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/actividades/
?contenido=26326.
231. Agrarian Act, arts. 63-72.
232. Id. arts. 73-75.
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(parcelas) that are assigned to individual ejido members.233 The
ejido may not collectively exploit a parcel without the written con-
sent of its titleholder.234 Within certain guidelines, individual parcel
owners are able to convey their parcels into the private sector. No
individual ejido member may own parcels representing more than
five percent of the total area of the ejido, nor more than the maxi-
mum limit applicable to all Mexicans under the small landholding
limitations applicable to all persons and corporations, discussed
below.235
It is also possible for the ejido, by the vote of its assembly, to choose to
collectively use all ejido land.23 6 The ejido is also free to opt out of this
collective regime, once in it.237
C. ASSOCIATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES
The ejido enjoys considerable freedom in entering into transactions
with persons or entities outside of the ejido for the temporary use or ex-
ploitation of ejido lands. Such transactions can range from joint ventures,
other types of contractual associations, or leases. For the purposes of the
remaining discussion, all of these shall be referred to as "use agree-
ments." The following are some examples of allowable use agreements
under the Agrarian Law:
" The ejido, acting through its assembly, may enter into use agree-
ments with respect to the common use areas described above.238
" An individual ejido member who holds title to a parcel, as described
above, is similarly free to enter into use agreements. 239 Such agree-
ment does not require permission of the ejido or any authority.240
" The term of the use agreement may be for the lifetime of the project
involved, not to exceed thirty years. However, the term is
extendable.24'
It is noteworthy that the Agrarian Law uses the term "any" to describe
the use agreements that may be entered into. There appear to be no
limitations.
D. USE OF EJIDO PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL
Article 46 of the Agrarian Law permits the ejido, in the case of com-
mon use lands, or the individual holder of a parcel in the case of a parcel,
to secure loans by granting the creditor the usufruct (the product or fruit)
233. Id. arts. 76-86.
234. Id. art. 77.
235. Id. art. 47.
236. Id. art. 11.
237. Id.
238. Id. art. 45.
239. Id.
240. Id. art.79.
241. Id. art. 45.
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of such respective properties. 242 Such grant may only be made to a credit
institution (e.g. bank) or the entity with which the ejido or parcel owner
has entered into an association or use agreement. 243 In the event of de-
fault, the creditor is only entitled to the usufruct for a stipulated period of
time, after which the usufruct goes back to the grantor.244 This means
that the creditor is not entitled to foreclose upon the land itself. To exer-
cise its rights in the collateral, the creditor must petition an agrarian tri-
bunal, and the agreement granting the right must be entered into before a
public notary and be recorded in the Agrarian Registry. 245
Due to the fact that the creditor is only entitled to a usufruct for a
certain period of time, must plead before an agrarian tribunal, and may
not resort to extra-judicial procedures in enforcing its rights in the collat-
eral, it is hard to imagine this security device appealing to private sector
banks providing regular credit. This limitation must be considered a ma-
jor impediment to the modernization of the ejido.
E. SALE OR TRANSFER OF EJIDo LANDS To THiIRD PARTIES
(i) Transfer to governmental entity. Lands for human settlement may
be transferred to municipal or similar governmental entities only, when
needed to provide public services.246
(ii) Transfer of "common use" property. In cases of manifest public
utility, an ejido may contribute "common use" lands to regular business
corporations whose shareholders consist of ejido members, other ejidos,
and even third parties.247 The plan must be approved by the ejido assem-
bly and the Agrarian Attorney General. The contribution will also be
subject to the following:
" The value of the lands contributed in exchange for shares must be at
least equal the value established by the government agency called
Comision de Avaluos de Bienes Nacionales (Commission for the Ap-
praisal of National Properties) or any credit institution (e.g.,
bank) 248
" In the event of corporate liquidation, the ejido and ejido members
will have a preferential right over non-ejidal shareholders to receive
the contributed lands as an in-kind distribution.249
(iii) Privatization of parcels.
By far the most normal way to transfer or privatize ejidal lands is by
transfer of specific parcels by their individual holders. The rules are as
follows:




246. Id. art. 65.
247. Id. art. 75.
248. Id. art. 75(IV).
249. Id. art. 75(V).
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" Once a majority of the parcels designated by the ejido have been
assigned to ejido members, the ejido assembly may vote to allow in-
dividual parcel owners to own their parcels in fee simple, that is, as
full owners of such parcels and incorporating such parcels into the
private sector.250 After the assembly has given such approval, each
individual parcel owner may convert the parcel to the private sector
by petitioning the Agrarian National Registry to deregister the par-
cel.2 51 The Agrarian National Registry will then issue to the owner a
certificate of ownership, which the ejido owner may then register
with the (normal) public registry of property.252 From that point for-
ward, the property is in the private sector with respect to that parcel
owner. 253
" But, should the parcel owner (now regular owner) of the property
wish to convey the land to someone else, the ejido is not done. He or
she must give a right of first refusal to purchase the land to the fol-
lowing, in this order:
O Family members;
o Those who have worked the land in question for more than one
year;
O Other members of the ejido;
O Neighbors (avecindados) of the ejido;
o The ejido, itself.2 54
Presentation of a notice of sale, prepared before a public notary or two
witnesses, and delivered to the commissariat of the ejido, constitutes valid
evidence of notice to all the persons or entity listed above.255 Such per-
sons or entity have thirty days in which to declare their intent to exercise
their right of first refusal. 256 If the right is not exercised, the owner of the
land is free to sell or transfer to any third party.257 Once consummated,
neither the ejido nor any of the above persons have any further rights in
the property. 258
The sale must be for a price at least equal to the appraised value set by
the Comision de Avaluos de Bienes Nacionales (Commission for the Ap-
praisal of National Properties) or any credit institution (e.g., bank).259
IV. CONCLUSION
The struggle that would commence in 1910 has been called the "first
250. Id. art. 81.
251. Id. art. 82.
252. Id
253. Id.
254. Id. art. 84.
255. Id. art. 85.
256. Id. art. 84.
257. Id
258. Id.
259. Id art. 86.
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successful revolution" of the 20th century.260 Such success would serve to
end the lives of millions, disrupt the ownership of property on a large
scale, provoke the intervention of the U.S. military at least twice, expose
the utter dependency of Mexico upon the flow (or shut-off) of foreign
arms, and create a new type of romantic revolutionary hero, thanks in
large part to another revolution, this one technological, in the form of the
motion picture camera. It would, in the year 1917, give Mexico its third
and current, constitution. One article of that new charter, Article 27,
would encapsulate many of the ideas regarding land use and tenure for
which the Revolution was waged.
And yet the label of "success" should not belong to a program that has
institutionalized and preserved poverty for millions of Mexicans strewn
across its great land mass. A drive across the dirt roads of almost any
region will reveal village after village predominantly peopled by women
and children, except perhaps for the months of December until February
when the young men return as conquering heroes, their pockets filled
with money from their stints as emigrant laborers.
The "success" of the last 100 years of Mexican land reform, if indeed
such label is accurate, might be better viewed in the sepia tones not of
material, but political accomplishment. In the Revolution and beyond, an
astute political class was able to fashion a formula for the survival of a
process that would give Mexico a century of peace (its conflicts with the
Catholic Church apart) and relative prosperity despite its real accom-
plishments in the fields. In the last 100 years, the private ownership of
Mexican real property in general, and foreign ownership of real property
in particular, have been marked by a stability and legal security seldom
enjoyed in other developing countries. The restrictions on foreign owner-
ship of Mexican land have not deterred foreigners from purchasing Mexi-
can property, nor have the size limitations placed on individual and
corporate land ownership crimped reasonable investment programs in
the agricultural sector.
In the end, the successes or failures of land reform in the last 100 years
have mattered less because land itself has mattered less. In the current
stretch of Mexican history, land has become detached from wealth, in
particular from the expectation of self-betterment. It is only for these
reasons that Mexican history does not swirl about its distribution and ten-
ure as it did in the past. The great, great grandsons of the aggrieved peas-
ants of a bygone era will sell their dunes of white sand to the Marriott
hotel chain, or they will work as waiters in exclusive restaurants in Cabo
San Lucas, for good tips. And life will go on.
260. John Mason Hart, The Mexican Revolution, in TmlE OXFoRIl, HISTORY OF ME--XICO
435 (2000).
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